



Al Sommer, an esteemed securities lawyer and former commissioner of the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), as well as a former law partner of mine,
recently made these comments on the development of the internal investigation mech-
anism utilized with ever-increasing frequency during the past decade by American
business:
Internal investigations had been performed before the SEC announced its voluntary
disclosure policy in the mid-1970s. But as a result of the Commission's voluntary dis-
closure program, a larger number of important and publicized investigations were un-
dertaken. The result has been the development of a new institution-the internal
investigation-which is an extra-legal institution, because there is no statutory basis for it.
There is a broad common-law basis for the proposition that if a corporation senses there
has been wrong-doing, management has an obligation to ascertain the extent of it and to
pursue a remedy. Nonetheless, there is no statute that directs a corporation to conduct an
internal investigation.
Despite the absence of formalized legal support, a set of "laws" has developed
around the investigations program initiated by the Commission. A good deal of common
practice has developed that can be found in various manuals and articles. Entire congeries
of techniques have developed to deal with a problem that requires investigation. It does
not necessarily have to be a matter involving securities fraud. Wherever management
finds a problem it wants to eradicate effectively and in an objective fashion, it may resort
to this new technique of internal investigation. I think this is a very important develop-
ment in the area of corporate law.'
Let me relate to you how I have become familiar with what Al Sommer labels as
this extra-legal institution of the internal corporate investigation. I have read much
and even written some of the relevant legal literature in the past five or six years. 2
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However, I first began to observe the development of corporate self-investigations as
an outgrowth of the increased pace of the SEC's nationwide enforcement program in
the early 1960s.
II. SEC's 1960s Enforcement Program: The VTR Example
Over two decades ago in the pre-Sporkin era, when I was a young enforcement
attorney in the SEC's Division of Trading and Exchanges, Irv Pollack was the
principal architect of the SEC's nationwide enforcement program. 3 At that time the
civil injunctive action was the favored enforcement tool.4 But for a leader as creative
as Pollack, merely obtaining an injunction was not sufficient to resolve particularly
complex, egregious cases. Consequently, the Enforcement staff was encouraged to
seek sometimes novel, somewhat exotic additional relief in important civil injunctive
actions. Such ancillary relief, as it came to be called, was designed to make victims
whole and to restore corporate circumstances to healthier, pre-violation, law-abiding
conditions: it was an important supplement to the traditional injunctive order,5 which
merely deterred future violations. The decade of the 1960s saw SEC civil injunctive
enforcement actions request with increasing regularity such ancillary relief. The SEC
sought ancillary relief in such forms as appointment of receivers or special agents,
restitution or disgorgement of ill-gotten gains, limitations on activities of officers or
Corrupt Practices Act, 47 U. CHI. L. REv. 803 (1980); Pickholz, Confronting SEC Pressure: A Need For Legal Audits,
Legal Times of Wash., Oct. 29, 1979, at 14-15; see also Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981); In re Sealed
Case (Tesoro Petroleum), 676 F.2d 793 (D.C. Cir. 1982); In re John Doe Corp. (Southland Corp.), 675 F.2d 482 (2d Cir.
1982); Comment, The Attorney-Client Privilege, the Self-Evaluative Report Privilege, and Diversified Industries, Inc. v.
Meridith, 40 OHIo ST. L.J. 699 (1979).
3. Irving M. Pollack later became Director of the SEC's Division of Trading and Markets and in that position ran
the nationwide enforcement program throughout the 1960s for the SEC under the chairmanship of Manuel F. Cohen. One
of his principal enforcement deputies was Stanley Sporkin. See Mathews & Klein, Manuel F. Cohen In Perspective:
Manny-We Miss Your Sparkle! 46 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 719 (1978). Pollack thereafter became the first Director of the
SEC's newly created Division of Enforcement in 1972 and turned the leadership of the enforcement program over
completely to Sporkin in 1974 when Pollack was elevated to membership on the Commission itself.
4. See, e.g., Andrd, The Collateral Consequences of SEC Injunctive Relief. Mild Prophylactic or Perpetual
Hazard? 1981 U. ILL. L. REv. 625; Bemporad, Injunctive Relief in SEC Civil Actions: The Scope of Judicial Discretion,
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1303-06 (1975).
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(1979); Malley, Far-Reaching Equitable Remedies under the Securities Act and the Growth of Federal Corporate Law, 17
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1979); Mathews, Recent Trends in SEC Requested Ancillary Relief in SEC Civil Injunctive Actions in 1 NEGOTIATING SEC
CONSENT DECREES: TARGETS AND TACTICS FOR CIVIL INJUNcTIVE ACTIONS 270 (A. Mathews ed. 1979); Mathews,
Recent Trends in SEC Requested Ancillary Relief in SEC Civil Injunctive Actions, 31 Bus. LAw. 1323 (1976); Sporkin,
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directors, wholesale restructuring of boards of directors, accountings, and restrictions
on voting blocs of stock and rescission offers.
6
I should note, however, that pleas for these novel forms of ancillary relief did
not always come from the Commission or its Staff. Sometimes, defense counsel in
negotiating an enforcement settlement would offer a new approach in order to avoid
unduly severe sanctions posed by the particular ancillary remedy initially sought by
the Commission. For example, in a major corporate fraud suit that I litigated for the
Commission in 1965 and 1966, SEC v. VTR, Inc.,7 the SEC sought, in addition to
injunctive relief, restitution of over $1.2 million from the principal officers and
directors of the corporate defendant, as well as appointment of a receiver to assure
that corporate affairs would be conducted properly, that all self-dealing would be
halted, and that the company's deficient SEC filings would be corrected.
Astute defense counsel, wiser and more experienced than I, were willing to
counsel their clients to provide the requested restitution after an appropriate account-
ing, but refused to consider appointment of a receiver.8 Such drastic relief as
receivership could well have forced VTR, then a solvent ongoing business with
securities listed on the American Stock Exchange, into bankruptcy. Receivership,
even when temporary and limited, often triggers defaults in lines of credit, drives
away existing and potential customers, and scares employees and agents into seeking
new employment. Consequently, innocent public shareholders do not necessarily
benefit from a receivership. VTR's able counsel countered the SEC's request for a
receiver with an offer to have the district court appoint three new independent direc-
tors to constitute a court-supervised majority on the five-person board (one of the new
independent directors to serve as chair) and to charge the independent directors to
pursue an internal corporate investigation. The court accepted this new approach. 9
The internal corporate special investigation encompassed the activities of VTR's
management embraced in the Commission's complaint. It led to the filing of the
mandated accounting with the court and eventually to payment of over $1.2 million in
disgorgement to rectify or pay off illegal loans to corporate insiders. ' The VTR case
preceded the now infamous Texas Gulf Sulphur litigation" and was a unique learning
experience for me.
There may have been earlier cases of court-ordered internal investigations (apart
from traditional investigations by court-appointed receivers or Chapter X bankruptcy
6. See, e.g., Ellsworth, Disgorgement in Securities Fraud Actions Brought by the SEC, 1977 DUKE L.J. 641;
Farrand, Ancillary Remedies in SEC Civil Enforcement Suits, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1779 (1976); Jacobs, supra note 5, at
410-21; Mathews, Recent Trends in SEC Requested Ancillary Relief in SEC Civil Injunctive Actions, 31 Bus. LAw. 1323
(1976); Comment, Court-Appointed Directors: Ancillary Relief in Federal Securities Law Enforcement Actions, 64 GEo.
L.J. 737 (1976); Comment, supra note 5.
7. SEC v. VTR, Inc., SEC Lit. Release No. 3311 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); SEC Lit. Release No. 3306 (S.D.N.Y. 1965);
SEC Lit. Release No. 3356 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); SEC v. V'TR, Inc., 32 SEC Ann. Rep. 116-17 (1966); see SEC v. VTR,
Inc., 39 F.R.D. 19 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) [all hereinafter cited as VTR Case].
8. Those defense counsel were Milton S. Gould and Arthur Christy, veterans of many SEC enforcement actions
and white-collar criminal cases arising therefrom.
9. VTR Case, supra note 7.
10. Id.
11. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en bane).
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reorganization trustees)12 in the context of SEC civil injunctive actions, but VTR was
my introduction to the field of corporate self-investigations, which has burgeoned
during the past 20 years into a useful technique in American corporate life and law.
I left the SEC Enforcement staff in October 1969, a day or two after filing the
injunctive complaint in S.E.C. v. ParvinlDohrmann Co.,' 3 which embraced classic
Rule lob-5 violations, market manipulation, and shady "influence peddling" in an
attempt by a large, public corporation to cause the SEC to lift a trading suspension.14
The Commission eventually settled the case, obtaining, in addition to a traditional
injunctive order, various types of ancillary relief against certain individual
defendants. Ancillary relief included orders prohibiting certain defendants from con-
tinuing to serve as directors of Parvin/Dohrmann without prior SEC approval, requir-
ing defendants to divest themselves of the company's stock, and requiring disgorge-
ment from certain defendants of their ill-gotten gains.' 5
III. EARLY 1970s: The MATTEL CONSENT DECREE
Shortly thereafter, in the early 1970s, in the Ecological Science case, 16 an SEC
injunctive action, the Second Circuit approved a district court order appointing a
so-called limited receiver with several powers. The limited receiver was to in-
vestigate and issue a public report on certain secret securities transactions, supervise
the company's public disclosures, including SEC filings and press releases, and hold
a shareholders' meeting to accomplish the election of a new board of directors.
17
Thus, by the early 1970s, the SEC was gradually learning that an efficacious way to
straighten out huge corporate messes brought to surface by some of its major enforce-
ment actions was to restructure boards of directors and cause independent directors or
their special counsel to accomplish internal corporate self-investigations, rather than
to tie up scarce government resources to do the whole job in each case.
In 1972, 1973, and 1974, Manny Cohen and I had several occasions to utilize
what defense counsel had taught me several years earlier in VTR.' 8 In 1972, in the
American Agronomics case, 19 we negotiated a consent injunction with ancillary relief
that provided for a restructuring of the board of directors and a special internal
12. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § i106(a)(4) (1982); 2 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 754-63 (1961); 5 L. Loss,
SEcuRTIEs REGULATION 2688-95 (Supp. 1969).
13. [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 92,500 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 30, 1969).
14. Id.; see also United States v. Sweig, 316 F. Supp. 1148 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (criminal proceeding against an agent
of ParvinlDohrmann Co. for conspiracy to defraud United States and for perjury).
15. SEC v. Parvin! Dohrmann Co., [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 92,500 (S.D.N.Y.
Oct. 30, 1969) (judgment of permanent injunction regarding anti-fraud violations, non-disclosures, and improper corpo-
rate purpose), [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 92,522 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 18, 1969) (consent
judgment regarding exchange of stock and violations of anti-fraud provisions), [ 1969-1970 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 92,615 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 1970) (summary of briefs) [all hereinafter cited as Parvin/Dohrmann Case].
16. SEC v. Ecological Science Corp., [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 93,025 (S.D.N.Y.
Apr. 30, 1971); see also Ecological Science Corp. v. SEC, [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
93,663 (D.C. Cir. Nov., 1972).
17. SEC v. Koenig (Ecological Science), 469 F.2d 198, 202 (2d Cir. 1972). Cf. United States v. Koenig, 388 F.
Supp. 670 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), in which former New York City Mayor Robert Wagner served as the limited receiver. While
he served an investigative and monitoring function, he was not charged by the consent decree to take over the management
of the corporation from its duly (and newly) elected board of directors.
18. See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text.
19. SEC v. American Agronomics Corp., SEC Lit. Release No. 5667 (S.D. Ohio 1972).
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investigation. The case dealt with the allegedly fraudulent sale of investment contract
interests in orange groves. As ancillary relief the company and its principals agreed to
perform the following steps:
1. Engage certified public accountants to conduct a survey of all persons who
had purchased grove securities within the prior five years.
2. Within sixty days after the commencement of this survey, the independent
certified public accountants were required to furnish to Agronomics and the Commis-
sion a report containing a summary of the responses to the survey. That report was
then to be submitted to a special counsel appointed by the court and retained by
Agronomics, who was to determine, based on the facts before him, if there were any
individuals for whom the purchase of an Agronomics investment contract was unsuit-
able at the time of the purchase. To guide the special counsel in this determination of
suitability, the decree set out the following factors: (i) gross income; (ii) net worth;
(iii) income tax bracket; (iv) size of investment in grove securities; (v) other in-
vestments; (vi) any other relevant circumstances. These factors were to be applied as
of time of purchase by the individual orange grove investors.
If the special counsel determined a purchase was unsuitable, the purchaser was
to be offered a rescission by Agronomics, including refund of all payments made to
Agronomics plus interest and reasonable attorney fees, less any payments received by
the grove owners as a result of orange production. Response to the survey and
acceptance of an offer of rescission was entirely voluntary on the part of the in-
dividual grove owners. In no way did it affect the individual grove owner's rights to
seek any legal or equitable relief that might have been available to him.
3. The defendants also were required to take steps to assure that equitable
treatment was given to any individual who paid maintenance on an unplanted grove,
was shown a grove other than his own, or was paid for orange production that was not
produced by his grove.
4. The two individual defendants agreed to deposit with Agronomics 60,000
shares of Agronomics common stock to be used to satisfy any expenses to Agronom-
ics that might arise as a result of any of the conduct alleged in the Commission's
complaint and also agreed to pay reasonable expenses in connection with the registra-
tion of these shares if registration should become necessary.
5. The Board of Directors of Agronomics was restructured to include at least
forty percent independent representation. An accounting committee of the in-
dependent directors was to be established. The two individual defendants were
prohibited from acting as officers of Agronomics, their salaries as directors and
consultants to the corporation were limited to $35,000 per year, and in the event
either of them severed his employment relationship with Agronomics during the
following five years, he became obligated to pay $12,500 per year to Agronomics
until the end of that period.20
In the American Agronomics case the SEC took a giant step toward corporate
20. Id.
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governance through consent decree by extensively restructuring a board of directors,
ordering an internal investigation by a special counsel, and other substantive actions.
In 1973, in the Coastal States Gas case, 2 ' Manny and I negotiated a consent
injunction that included as ancillary relief:
1. The Board of Directors of Coastal States Gas Corporation was increased
from ten to thirteen members, with six new independent members satisfactory to the
SEC to be designated by the court and elected by Coastal's Board.
2. Additionally, the order provided that Coastal's Board would elect a new
Executive Committee to be composed of three members, two of whom would be new
members designated by the court and satisfactory to the SEC and the other of whom
would be the chair. Independent legal counsel was to be available, at the corpora-
tion's expense, to advise the Executive Committee regarding their functions as direct-
ors and as members of the Executive Committee and regarding other related matters.
3. The order also provided for the appointment by Coastal of an independent
audit committee consisting of three members, a majority of whom were to be new
members of the Board.
4. The order further provided that Coastal would request its independent au-
ditors to furnish to the SEC the results of a special review of certain transactions
pertaining to the 1971 and 1972 financial statements and in connection therewith to
make disclosures and filings as required under applicable laws and regulations in light
of the results of such special review.
22
And in 1974, Manny and I were co-counsel23 in the Mattel case,2 4 which has
since been dubbed one of the seminal cases in the SEC's intrusion into corporation
governance via consent decree. 25 Mattel involved a serious fraud implicating certain
high level management officials of the company. The SEC's limited investigations
had uncovered falsified financial statements which stated millions of dollars of
fictitious earnings. Today, SEC Commissioner Treadway would call the case a class-
ic "cooked books" case.2 6
In negotiating a consent injunction in Mattel, Manny and I and our co-counsel
21. SEC v. Coastal States Gas Corp. (Oscar P. Wyatt, Jr.), SEC Lit. Release No. 6054 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 12, 1973)
at 2 SEC Docket No. 13 at 451 (Oct. 2, 1973) [hereinafter cited as Coastal States Case].
22. Id. In another injunctive consent decree in 1973, SEC v. Clinton Oil Co., SEC Lit. Release No. 5715 (D. Kan.
Jan. 30, 1973) at I SEC Docket No. 1 at 28 (Feb. 13, 1975), SEC Lit. Release No. 5798 (D. Kan. Mar. 20, 1973) at I
SEC Docket No. 8 at 23 (Apr. 3, 1973) [hereinafter cited as Clinton Oil Case], the SEC took a substantial step forward in
corporate governance through enforcement: The SEC had the court appoint an entirely new board of directors. The theory
was that the old board had been engaged in mismanagement and egregious fraud and had to be completely insulated from
the future management of the corporation.
23. Our co-counsel were Dick Borow and Ron Loeb of Irell & Manella, and Ray Ferris, then General Counsel of
Mattel.
24. SEC v. Mattel, Inc., SEC Lit. Release No. 6467 (D.D.C. Aug. 5. 1974) at 4 SEC Docket No. 20 at 724 (Aug.
20, 1974), SEC Lit. Release No. 6531 (D.D.C. Odt. 2, 1974) at 5 SEC Docket No. 8 at 241 (Oct. 16, 1974), SEC Lit.
Release No. 6532 (D.D.C. Oct. 3, 1974) at 5 SEC Docket No. 8 at 242 (Oct. 16, 1974) [hereinafter cited as 1974 Mattel
Case]; see also, United States v. Handler, [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SeC. L. REt. (CCH) 96,519 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 3,
1978); SEC v. Mattel, No. CV-74-2958-FW (C.D. Cal. 1977) (injunction against disclosure of information by special
counsel); Handler v. SEC, 430 F. Supp. 71 (C.D. Dal. 1977), aff d, 610 F.2d 656 (9th Cir. 1979).
25. See, e.g., Comment, Court-Appointed Directors: Ancillary Relief in Federal Securities Law Enforcement
Actions, 64 GEO L.J. 737, 738 (1976).
26. Speech by SEC Commissioner James C. Treadway, Jr., before Institute For Corporate Counsel in Los Angeles
(March 11, 1983), reprinted as Treadway, Cooked Books: No New Recipes, 30 FED. BAR NEws & J. 323 (1983).
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strived to avoid appointment of a traditional or temporary receiver, which we felt
might unfairly drive the company into bankruptcy. We also wanted to avoid the
severity of a limited receiver of the type utilized in Ecological Science. In Mattel, the
individual members of management allegedly involved in the fraud included certain
officer-directors who were unwilling to consent to a bar from serving as directors, as
some of the defendants in ParvinlDohrmann had done. But the Mattel Board qua
Board was willing to follow the VTR example by consenting to appointment of a
majority of new, unaffiliated directors, approved by the SEC and acceptable to the
court, to monitor stewardship of the company. The Board also was willing to submit
to even more novel ancillary relief. Aided by the flexibility and ingenuity of Stanley
Sporkin and his then assistant Irwin Borowski, we hammered out what was in 1974 a
significant SEC consent injunctive decree.
The settlement required that the new independent directors appoint a special
counsel satisfactory to the court and the Commission to investigate the allegations
embraced by the SEC injunctive complaint, to prepare and file with the SEC a public
report thereof, and to recommend to a newly constituted Litigation and Claims
Committee (consisting of independent directors) what, if any, causes of action the
corporation should pursue against prior management or third parties. The decree also
required Mattel to appoint and maintain a new Executive Committee (a majority of
the members of which had to be independent directors) and a Financial Controls and
Audit Committee (a majority of whose members were independent directors) and
required the special counsel to retain a special auditor (an outside independent CPA
firm) to report on Mattel's accounting practices. 27
Seth Hufstetler became special counsel. His performance in the Mattel litigation
demonstrated how a large public company could investigate very serious corporate
misconduct through the use of an independent, outside counsel and thereby enable the
corporation's board of directors to clean its own house, maintain order, and restore
the shareholders' faith in the company's capacity to be law-abiding and in the cor-
poration's general business reputation. The novel relief in the Mattel consent decree
later survived constitutional and other attacks in both criminal and civil forums. 28 In
the Mattel litigation, the court specifically acknowledged that "the appointment of
Special Counsel is a legally recognized form of ancillary relief" in SEC civil in- -
29junctive actions. Indeed, the court described appointment of special counsel as a
"desirable and economical practice" that "allows the company to keep its own house
clean and avoid unnecessary governmental supervision.' '30
In 1973, prior to Mattel, Stanley Sporkin had settled a portion of the SEC's
litigation against Robert Vesco 31 through the vehicle of a novel consent decree. If my
recollection is correct, it was again Milton Gould (with whom I had dealt in VTR)
27. SEC v. Mattel, Inc., [1974 Transfer Binder] FED. Sec. L. REt'. (CCH) 94,754 (D.D.C. Aug. 8, 1974); see
also 1974 Mattel Case, supra note 24.
28. Handler v. SEC, 430 F. Supp. 71, 74 (C.D. Cal. 1977), affd, 610 F.2d 656 (9th Cir. 1979) (civil case
challenging consent decree issued in Mattel); United States v. Handler, [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH)
T 96,519 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 3, 1978) (criminal action against Mattel directors for conspiracy to commit fraud).
29. United States v. Handler, [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 96,519 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 3, 1978).
30. Id. at 94,024.
31. SEC v. Vesco [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 93,671 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 11, 1973).
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who negotiated the International Controls Corp. (ICC) consent decree with Sporkin.
The ICC decree provided broad ancillary relief in lieu of the appointment of a
receiver for ICC, which the SEC had sought initially. 32 The relief included appoint-
ment of an independent special counsel to conduct a court-monitored investigation,
33
court appointment of a whole new interim board of directors, and a special counsel
with power to pursue all claims on behalf of ICC by instituting all necessary litigation
himself, although no claims could be settled without approval of both the SEC and
the court. 34 Thus, the ICC settlement was much more akin to a temporary limited
receivership than was the Mattel decree.
IV. WATERGATE AND ITS AFTERMATH: FROM ILLEGAL DOMESTIC POLITICAL
CONTRIBUTIONS TO SENSITIVE AND QUESTIONABLE FOREIGN PAYMENTS
TO COMMERCIAL BRIBES, KICKBACKS AND MANAGEMENT FRAUD TO
UNDISCLOSED CORPORATE PERKS
The Mattel experience, which left the company itself directing the special coun-
sel in accomplishing the internal investigation, pleased both the SEC and the com-
pany. The company was realigned and restored to health, for the benefit of all its
public shareholders. The SEC utilized the VTR and Mattel types of settlements as
models for a potpourri of consent decrees throughout the 1970s. At first, the cases did
not fall into any particular pattern. 35 Then, as particular events caused the SEC's
Enforcement Division to tailor special enforcement programs and as changing cir-
cumstances dictated shifting enforcement priorities to different programs, the
"special investigation" became standard ancillary relief in several enforcement
waves. First, commencing in late 1974, came the Watergate domestic campaign
contribution cases regarding political slush funds. Second, was the infamous sensi-
tive and questionable foreign payments program, which eventually spawned passage
of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in late 1977. Third, was a series of cases dealing
with illegal domestic kickbacks, commercial bribes, or other questionable, com-
mercial payments generally labelled management fraud. Fourth, was a flurry of cases
dealing with undisclosed corporate perquisites-the "perks" cases. 3 6
It gradually became rather routine to settle an SEC enforcement case against a
major corporation by agreeing to have outside counsel serve as special counsel in
conducting an internal corporate investigation on behalf of the company's board of
directors or audit committee. Sometimes the settlements required adding new in-
dependent directors to the board; sometimes they did not. In almost all cases, the
company was required to publicize the special counsel's or audit committee's report
32. See id.; see also International Controls Corp. v. Vesco, 490 F.2d 1334, 1339-40 (2d Cir. 1974).
33. SEC v. Vesco, [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 93,671 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 11, 1973); see
also Hogan & Hartson v. Butowsky, 459 F. Supp. 796 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
34. SEC v. Vesco, [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 93,671 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 11, 1973).
The court-appointed interim board served for several years until a Special Master supervised a new board election. Malhas
v. Shinn, 597 F.2d 28 (2d Cir. 1979); SEC v. Vesco, 571 F.2d 129 (2d Cir. 1978).
35. See, e.g., SEC v. Westgate-Califomia Corp., SEC Lit. Release No. 6142 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 9, 1973) at 3 SEC
Docket No. I at 30 (Nov. 20, 1973).
36. See, e.g., Mathews & Thompson, SEC [1978] Enforcement Program Focuses on Payments And Perquisites,
SEC '79, at 15 (1979).
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of investigation or a summary thereof. For example, two days after the Mattel
settlement, the SEC filed a consent decree in the American Ship Building (AmShip)
case, 37 the first domestic illegal campaign contributions case. The consent order
embraced the following ancillary relief:
The order also requires the defendant American Ship Building Company to establish a
Special Review Committee consisting of a chairman not affiliated with the company and
at least two independent members of the company's Board of Directors to review the
company's books and records since 1970 in order to determine what monies were used for
purposes other than those shown on the company's books and records. A report will then
be prepared and filed with the Commission as an exhibit to a current Form 8-K. The
company's Board of Directors will then review the report and implement the findings of
said report. If the Commission is not satisfied with the actions of the Board of Directors it
reserves the right to seek such further relief as may be necessary or appropriate. Defendant
George M. Steinbrenner III further agrees that if the Board of Directors determines that he
should be required to reimburse the company for funds expended for political or any other
unauthorized corporate purposes, as well as expenses incurred by the company by virtue
of the Review Committee's investigation, Steinbrenner shall pay to the company all such
amounts. Again if the Commission is not satisfied with the findings of the Board of
Directors of the company, the Commission has the right to seek such relief as may be
necessary or appropriate.
38
AmShip's Review Committee used outside counsel to conduct the required internal
investigation and to prepare the report filed with the Commission. A number of
domestic political campaign contribution cases followed; almost all settled with con-
sent decrees requiring an internal investigation. 39
These domestic Watergate cases quickly led the SEC Enforcement Program into
the era of sensitive and questionable foreign payments cases and eventually to an
ongoing management fraud program. Ted Levine and Ed Herlihy in their important
law review article in 1976 characterized the scope of the problem the SEC had found
within corporate America:
37. See SEC v. American Ship Building (George M. Steinbrenner III), SEC Lit. Release No. 6534 (D.D.C. Oct. 4,
1974) at 5 SEC Docket No. 8 at 242 (Oct. 16, 1974) (complaint alleged the making of domestic political contributions and
other payments in excess of $120,000 listed in company books and records as payments to employees).
38. Id.
39. See, e.g., SEC v. Waste Management, Inc., SEC Lit. Release No. 7333 (D.D.C. Mar. 29, 1976) at 9 SEC
Docket No. 6 at 362 (Apr. 13, 1976) [hereinafter cited as Waste Management Case]; SEC v. BraniffAirways, Inc., SEC
Lit. Release No. 7327 (D.D.C. Mar. 24, 1976) at 9 SEC Docket No. 5 at 292 (Apr. 6, 1976) [hereinafter cited as Braniff
Airways Case]; Missouri Pub. Serv. Co., SEC Lit. Release No. 7299 (W.D. Mo. Mar. 4, 1976) at 9 SEC Docket No. 2 at
114 (Mar. 16, 1976) [hereinafter cited as Missouri Public Service Case]; SEC v. Ashland Oil, Inc., SEC Lit. Release No.
6890 (D.D.C. May 14, 1975) at 7 SEC Docket No. 1 at 362 (June 4, 1975) [hereinafter cited as Ashland Oil Case]; SEC
v. Northrop Corp., SEC Lit. Release No. 6839 (D.D.C. Apr. 16, 1975) at 6 SEC Docket No. 16 at 410 (Apr. 29, 1975)
SEC Lit. Release No. 6842 (D.D.C. Apr. 16, 1975) at 6 SEC Docket No. 16 at 419 (Apr. 29, 1975) [hereinafter cited as
Northrop Case]; SEC v. Sanitas Serv. Co., SEC Lit. Release No. 6829 (D.D.C. Apr. I1, 1975) at 6 SEC Docket No. 16
at 107 (Apr. 29, 1975), SEC Lit. Release No. 6906 (D.D.C. May 29, 1975) at 7 SEC Docket No. 2 at 92 (June 10, 1975),
SEC Lit. Release No. 6918 (D.D.C. June 4, 1975) at 7 SEC Docket No. 3 at 133 (June 17, 1975), SEC Lit. Rel. No. 6952
(June 30, 1975) at 7 SEC Docket No. 7 at 367 (July 15, 1975), SEC Lit. Release No. 7002 (D.D.C. July 24, 1975) at 7
SEC Docket No. 10 at 451 (Aug. 5, 1975), SEC Lit. Release No. 7184 (D.D.C. Nov. 28, 1975) at 8 SEC Docket No. 9 at
681 (Dec. 16, 1975), SEC Lit. Release No. 7422 (D.D.C. 1976) [hereinafter cited as Sanitas Case]; SEC v. Gulf Oil
Corp., SEC Lit. Release No. 6780 (D.D.C. Mar. 11, 1975) at 6 SEC Docket No. 11 at 465 (Mar. 25, 1975) [hereinafter
cited as Gulf Oil Case]; SEC v. Phillips Petroleum Co., SEC Lit. Release No. 6770 (D.D.C. Mar. 7, 1975) at 6 SEC
Docket No. 6 at 419 (Mar. 19, 1975) [hereinafter cited as Phillips Petroleum Case]; SEC v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg.
Co., SEC Lit. Release No. 6711 (D. Minn. Jan. 31, 1975) at 6 SEC Docket No. 6 at 242 (Feb. 18, 1975) [hereinafter cited
as 3M Case].
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Throughout much of history, corruption has been no stranger to money dealings
between businessmen, politicians, and others. The trail of Watergate, however, has led to
revelations of foreign and domestic bribes, kickbacks, political payoffs, and other
questionable financial transactions involving U.S. and foreign corporations to an unprece-
dented extent and degree. These transactions have been facilitated by elaborate methods
of concealment, including the falsification of records and the structuring of fictitious
transactions, which are generally lumped under the rubric "management fraud."
The complexity and variety of the cases involving management fraud have perplexed
observers. On a daily basis, new revelations of corporate misconduct, at home and
abroad, are made. Although there is no distinct model or prototype, several factors
typically are present, including the involvement of corporate management, the falsifica-
tion of corporate books and records, the accumulation of secret pools of corporate funds or
the diversion of funds from the corporate entity, and the illegality of the conduct in-
volved.40
The SEC's May 1976 Report to the Proxmire Committee of the United States
Senate 4 described the Commission's early efforts in the foreign payments enforce-
ment arena,42 encompassing enforcement actions against such major corporations as
Ashland Oil,43 Gulf Oil,44 Phillips Petroleum,4 5 Northrop,46 Braniff Airways,47
General Tire & Rubber,4 Lockheed, 49 and United Brands. 50 By the time the Foreign
40. Herlihy & Levine, Corporate Crisis: The Overseas Payment Problem, 8 LAW & POL'Y IN INT'L Bus. 547,
547-48 (1976) (footnotes omitted).
41. Report of the Securities and Exchange Commission on Questionable and Illegal Corporate Payments and
Practices Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) [hereinafter cited as
Proxmire Committee SEC Payments Report].
42. Professor John C. Coffee observed:
Improper payments stories first began to trickle out from the swamp of Watergate when the Special Prosecutor's
Office discovered that a sizable number of American corporations had made illegal political contributions during
the 1972 presidential campaign. This freshet quickly swelled to a steady stream with the subsequent investiga-
tion initiated by the SEC to determine whether the absence of disclosure surrounding these payments had
violated the federal securities laws. The floodstage was reached, however, only after the revelation of an
unrelated and unsuspected scandal: "Bananagate." The dramatic exposure of United Brands misconduct oc-
curred after the suicide of its prominent chief executive officer, Eli Black, whose death followed the commence-
ment of an SEC investigation into a $1.25 million payment, authorized by Black, to the President of Honduras,
apparently to avoid the imposition of a confiscatory export duty on bananas. "'Bananagate" shifted the focus of
both SEC and popular attention from illegal domestic political contributions to the broader issues arising out of
foreign and commercial bribery. It thus set the stage for the unfolding of the incredible saga of Lockheed
Corporation and its worldwide efforts to bribe senior ministers of friendly foreign governments. Other notable
instances of such payments, such as those of Gulf in South Korea, Exxon in Italy, and Northrop and Grumman
in the Middle East, have been described in detail elsewhere, and in the aggregate suggest a level of corporate
hubris and unchecked ambition reminiscent of Commodore Vanderbilt and the Nineteenth Century robber
barons.
Coffee, Beyond the Shut-Eyed Sentry: Toward a Theoretical View of Corporate Misconduct and an Effective Legal
Response, 63 VA. L. REV. 1099, 1115-16 (1977).
43. Ashland Oil Case, supra note 39.
44. Gulf Oil Case, supra note 39.
45. Phillips Petroleum Case, supra note 39.
46. Northrop Case, supra note 39.
47. Braniff Airways Case, supra note 39.
48. SEC v. General Tire & Rubber Co., SEC Lit. Release No. 7386 (D.D.C. May 10, 1976) at 9 SEC Docket No.
12 at 664 (May 25, 1976) [hereinafter cited as General Tire Case].
49. SEC v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., SEC Lit. Release No. 7355 (D.D.C. Apr. 13, 1976) at 9 SEC Docket No. 8 at
445 (Apr. 27, 1976) [hereinafter cited as Lockheed Case).
50. SEC v. United Brands Co., SEC Lit. Release No. 6827 (D.D.C. Apr. 10, 1975) at 6 SEC Docket No. 15 at 635
(Apr. 22, 1975), SEC Lit. Release No. 7251 (D.D.C. Jan. 27, 1976) at 8 SEC Docket No. 17 at 1177 (Feb. 10, 1976)
[hereinafter cited as United Brands Case].
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Corrupt Practices Act5' became effective in December 1977,52 or shortly thereafter,
the SEC had sued a potpourri of major American companies in questionable or illegal
payments cases, including Boeing,5 3 International Telephone & Telegraph,5 4 Gener-
al Refractories,55 Grumman, 56 Page Airways,57 Firestone Tire & Rubber, 58 General
Telephone & Electronics,5 9 Textron, 60 and International Systems and Controls.6 '
Special counsel "internal investigation" was standard operating procedure in virtual-
ly every one of the consent settlements. Moreover, this device was a routine method
employed in most of the commercial bribery, kickback, perks, and other management
fraud cases brought during the balance of the 1970s.
62
51. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(b)(2), 78m(b)(3), 78dd-1, 78dd-2 (1982).
52. See, e.g., Notification of Enactment of Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, SEC Act Release No. 34-14,478
[Accounting Series Releases Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) $ 72,264 (1978); A. LEVEN SON, A. MATHEWS, &
H. Prrr, FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES AND INTERNAL ACCOUNTING CONTROLS (1980); A. LEVENSEN, A. MATHEWS, &
H. Prrr, THE FOREIoN CoRRUPT PRACTICES ACT OF 1977. Do You KNOW THIS Acr GOVERNS DOMESTIC BUSINESS
AcnvmEs? (1978).
53. SEC v. Boeing Co., SEC Lit. Release No. 8482 (D.D.C. July 28, 1978) at 15 SEC Docket No. 8 at 535 (Aug.
15, 1978) [hereinafter cited as Boeing Case].
54. SEC v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., SEC Lit. Release No. 8407 (D.D.C. May 9, 1978) at 14 SEC Docket
No. 16 at 1076 (May 23, 1978), SEC Lit. Release No. 8590 (Nov. 2, 1978) at 16 SEC Docket No. I at 75 (Nov. 15, 1978)
[hereinafter cited as IT & T Case]; see also SEC v. IT & T, [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,586
(D.D.C. Nov. 2, 1978) (SEC complaint alleging IT & T engaged in questionable payments to foreign governments),
[1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 96,452 (D.D.C. May 26, 1978) (order denying motion to seal SEC
complaint and supporting documents).
55. SEC v. General Refractories Co., SEC Lit. Release No. 6898 (D.D.C. May 21, 1975) at 7 SEC Docket No. I at
53 (June 4, 1975), SEC Lit. Release No. 6919 (D.D.C. June 4, 1975) at 7 SEC Docket No. 3 at 133 (June 17, 1975), SEC
Lit. Release No. 6928 (D.D.C. June 11, 1975) at 7 SEC Docket No. 4 at 176 (June 24, 1975), SEC Lit. Release No. 7069
(D.D.C. Sept. 4, 1975) at 7 SEC Docket No. 16 at 812 (Sept. 16, 1976), SEC Lit. Release No. 7098 (D.D.C. Sept. 24,
1975) at 7 SEC Docket No. 19 at 960 (Oct. 7, 1975), SEC Lit. Release No. 7544 (D.D.C. Sept. 1, 1976) at 10 SEC
Docket No. 8 at 398 (Sept. 16, 1976) [hereinafter cited as General Refractories Case].
56. SEC v. Grumman Corp., SEC Lit. Release No. 8635 (D.D.C. Jan. 4, 1979) at 16 SEC Docket No. 10 at 644
(Jan. 16, 1979) [hereinafter cited as Grumman Case].
57. SEC v. Page Airways, Inc., SEC Lit. Release No. 8372 (D.D.C. 1978) at 14 SEC Docket No. 12 at 766 (Apr.
25, 1978) [hereinafter cited as Page Airways Case]; see also SEC v. Page Airways, Inc., [1979-1980 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,341 (W.D.N.Y. Apr. 8, 1980); SEC v. Page Airways, Inc. [1978 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,393 (D.D.C. Apr. 12, 1978).
58. SEC v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., SEC Lit. Release No. 7443 (D.D.C. June 15, 1976) at 9 SEC Docket No.
17 at 920 (June 30, 1976) [hereinafter cited as Firestone Case].
59. SEC v. General Tel. & Elecs. Corp., SEC Lit. Release No. 7760 (D.D.C. Jan. 31, 1977) at I SEC Docket No.
10 at 1662 (Feb. 21, 1977) [hereinafter cited as GT&E Case].
60. SEC v. Textron, Inc., SEC Lit. Release No. 8993 (D.D.C. Jan. 31, 1980) at 9 SEC Docket No. 6 at 462 (Feb.
12, 1980) [hereinafter cited as Textron Case].
61. SEC v. International Sys. & Controls Corp., [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,207
(D.D.C. Dec. 6, 1979); see also In re International Sys. & Controls Corp. Sec. Litig., 693 F.2d 1235 (5th Cir. 1982),
rev'g 91 F.R.D. 552 (S.D. Tex. 1981).
62. See, e.g., SEC v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., SEC Lit. Release No. 8460 (E.D. Wis. July 7, 1978) at 15 SEC
Docket No. 5 at 278 (July 25, 1975) [hereinafter cited as Schlitz Case]; SEC v. National Bank of Ga, SEC Lit. Release
No. 8395 (N.D. Ga. May 3, 1978) at 14 SEC Docket No. 15 at 1029 (May 16, 1978) [hereinafter cited as National Bank
of Georgia Case]; SEC v. Inflight Servs., Inc., SEC Lit. Release No. 8182 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 3, 1977) at 13 SEC Docket
No. 9 at 415 (Nov. 11, 1977) [hereinafter cited as Inflight Case]; SEC v. Sharon Steel Corp. (Posner), SEC Lit. Release
No. 8119 (D.D.C. Sept. 20, 1977) at 13 SEC Docket No. 3 at 178 (Oct. 4, 1977) [hereinafter cited as Sharon Steel Case];
SEC v. Ormand Indus., Inc., SEC Lit. Release No. 7910 (D.D.C. May 10, 1977) at 12 SEC Docket No. 15 at 1984 (Mar.
22, 1977) [hereinafter cited as Ormand Case]; SEC v. Solon Automated Servs., Inc., SEC Lit. Release No. 7887 (D.D.C.
Apr. 26, 1977) at 12 SEC Docket No. 2 at 271 (May 10, 1977) [hereinafter cited as Solon Case]; SECv. Potter Instrument
Co., SEC Lit. Release No. 7816 (D.D.C. Mar. 9, 1977) at I1 SEC Docket No. 15 at 1984 (Mar. 22, 1977) [hereinafter
cited as Potter Case]; SEC v. Canadian Javelin Ltd., SEC Lit. Release No. 7642 (D.D.C. Nov. 11, 1976) at 10 SEC
Docket No. 18 at 984 (Nov. 18, 1976), SEC Lit. Release No. 7779 (D.D.C. Feb. 14, 1977) at I SEC Docket No. 12 at
1772 (Mar. 1, 1977), SEC Lit. Release No. 8751 (May 14, 1979) at 17 SEC Lit. Release No. 9 at 647 (May 29, 1979)
[hereinafter cited as Canadian Javelin Case]; SEC v. Brad Ragan, Inc., SEC Lit. Release No. 7681 (W.D.N.C. Dec. 2,
1976) at 11 SEC Docket No. 1 at 1113 (Dec. 14, 1976) [hereinafter cited as Ragan Case]; SECv. Seagram Co., Ltd., SEC
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V. SHIFT FROM SEC-MANDATED, COURT-SUPERVISED, INDEPENDENT,
SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS TO CORPORATE-CONTROLLED, INTERNAL SELF-
INVESTIGATIONS: NORTHROP, GT&E, GRUMMAN, THE SEC "VOLUNTARY
PROGRAM," DIVERSIFIED INDUSTRIES, AND THE FCPA
As the sensitive foreign payments cases mushroomed in the mid-1970s, the
corporate defense bar awoke to the fact that proper corporate maneuvering in advance
of, or in the midst of, an SEC enforcement investigation might lead to a less painful
resolution of corporate payments problems than would be provided by a court-
supervised, SEC-monitored, consent-decree-restricted, independent special counsel
investigation-usually reported in the public press. Corporations and their counsel
began to ask why it would not be more prudent for a company to investigate itself
privately without court supervision, SEC monitoring, or inflexible conditions im-
posed by a consent decree. By employing a self-investigation procedure, a company
could use inside or outside counsel, not necessarily wholly independent, and at least
not subject to prior approval of the SEC or the court. It was thought that by putting
the corporate house in order in advance of an SEC enforcement attack or during the
pendency of an SEC enforcement investigation, a company should be able to negoti-
ate a milder settlement when the SEC did strike in a formal enforcement action and
thus, be able to achieve an internal investigation less painful and perhaps more
private than the special counsel investigations mandated by a rigid SEC consent
decree.
Thus, another step in voluntary corporate accountability was taken. For ex-
ample, in the Northrop foreign payments case, 6 3 two of my partners, Howard Willens
and Mike Klein, conducted the investigation ahead of the SEC, and their results were
later rolled into an SEC consent decree. 64 I suspect the conduct of the investigation
Lit. Release No. 8526 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 8, 1978) at 15 SEC Docket No. 14 at 1101 (Sept. 26, 1978) [hereinafter cited as
Seagram Case]; SEC v. E.T. Barwick Indus., Inc., SEC Lit. Release No. 7520 (D.D.C. Aug. 10, 1976) at 10 SEC
Docket No. 5 at 236 (Aug. 25, 1976), SEC Lit. Release No. 7640 (D.D.C. Nov. 8, 1976) at 10 SEC Docket No. 18 at 947
(Nov. 18, 1976), SEC Lit. Release No. 7767 (D.D.C. Feb. 1, 1977) at 11 SEC Docket No. 10 (Feb. 15, 1977)
[hereinafter cited as Barwick Case]; SEC v. Emersons, Ltd., SEC Lit. Release No. 7392 (D.D.C. May 11, 1976) at 9 SEC
Docket No. 12 at 667 (May 25, 1976) [hereinafter cited as Emersons Case]; Waste Management Case, supra note 39;
Sanitas Case, supra note 39; In re Playboy Enters., SEC Act Release No. 34-17,059, [1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. Re. (CCH) 82,635 (SEC Aug. 13, 1980); see also In re LTV Sec. Litig., 89 F.R.D. 595 (N.D. Tex. 1981);
Canadian Javelin, Ltd. v. Lawler, Kent & Eisenberg, 478 F. Supp. 448 (D.D.C. 1979); Ostemeck v. E.T. Barwick
Indus., 82 F.R.D. 81 (N.D. Ga. 1979); SEC v. Canadian Javelin, Ltd., 451 F. Supp. 594 (D.D.C. 1978), vacated on
procedural grounds, [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,742 (D.D.C. Dec. 13, 1978).
63. Northrop Case, supra note 39.
64. Northrop had commissioned outside counsel and outside auditors in March 1974 to conduct a massive internal
investigation on behalf of the company's independent outside directors as a result of the Watergate special prosecutor's
office investigation of unlawful domestic political contributions by the company. In May 1974, Northrop's Board Chair,
President, and Chief Executive Officer, Thomas V. Jones, and a former company vice president and director. James
Allen, as well as the company itself, pled guilty to felony charges filed by the Watergate special prosecutor's office
embracing illegal corporate domestic political campaign contributions. In May 1974 two private lawsuits-one class
action and one derivative suit (Springer v. Jones, Civ. No. 74-1455 (C.D. Cal. 1974))-were brought involving the
company and certain of its officers and directors. In November 1974, the independent outside directors received a special
investigative report from the company's outside auditors. Based upon the auditors' report, the independent outside
directors and outside special counsel conducted a worldwide investigation of Northrop's payments to foreign agents and
consultants.
The worldwide investigation was part of an undertaking proffered in settlement of the private actions, which also
required Northrop to appoint three new, independent members to its Board and to its Executive Committee supervising the
investigation. A comparable undertaking was included in an SEC consent injunctive decree filed in April 1975. By that
time Northrop-through its independent directors and outside counsel-virtually had completed the investigation. See
Report to The Board of Directors of Northrop Corporation on the Special Investigation of the Executive Committee 1-2
(July 16, 1975).
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was much more flexible, more private, and less painful than the averge foreign
puyments investigation conducted by an SEC-approved independent special counsel
pursuant to a consent decree. And I am sure the language in the report of the
ittvnstigatont was mre generic than in those cases in which the special counsel was
imposed and monitored from the start by both the SEC and the courtA
In both the Grumman6 and the GT&E67 foreign payments cases, corporations
followed the Northrop example and chose outside counsel to conduct speal in-
vestigations on behalf of the companies' respective audit committees prior to
negotiating consent injunctions with the SEC." In both cases, the eventual consent
decrees merely required publicizing the reports of investigations already prepared
voluntarily by the companies (although in Grumman one additional aspect of foreign
activities was required to be further pursued by independent counsel since regalar
outside counsel conducting the principal investigation had counsefled transactions in
one particular foreign country).
Corporate self-investigations not mandated by SEC consent decrees
mushroomed as the SEC developed its "'volntary program" in 1.975 and 1976. The
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit described the evolving practice
as follows:
As early as 1974 the SEC was engaged in investigating the political 'slush fund'"
practices of some corporations. Ititially the SEC staff carried out its own investigations,
but as the scope of the payments problem becanie apparent, extending to foreign as well as
domestic payments, the SEC realized that it did nt have the resources to investigate each
case carefully. In several 1974 enforcement actions, the SEC thus sought and obtained
consent decrees in which corporate defendants agreed to appoint special committees of
their boards of directors--composed entirely of directors unaffiliated with management-
to carry out independent investigations of the defendants' payment practices. These in-
vestigations were to be performed by outside counsil hired for that purpose and responsi-
65 Sohr vomuwntairs have raised questloni ahout hov Ar the SEC and eourse should leiene taemehed ir
inlrnaJ ctxporate governance by oreisig or supervising the appoir-tment of directr gud stractultoirg hoard cotintiices.
See for example, the discussion ofthe Mattel (SEC) and NAorhrvp (Spristger v, Jomes consient dec.rees it Cs s rskn. strpra
rwt,25, m740;
Judkial appointment of directo to boards Oft corporatois charged with securities laws 1i'50aln& is a new
remedy that promises to grow m use and inportane . Site COuns thus fmr have appointed dlrectors on y
purmnte to cocses- decrea or c mprnpmise sttliriWte; the legal prentnes underlying ths type of eieft and tis
rclative merits have yet to be argued fully befoe the couris, In ligh: of the taditional processes .r o lecting
corporate Miauaagr:nl, thu remedy of court appointed directors roi es the tunsrcrntal :seue of the fe dki
court's power to interpose itself in internal corporate affair bs fashioning such relief. This issu enGuompasses
nor only an erquity into the scope of the federal jUtlsictey' &JuriAieton bt aiso an t-msttgtie mto tho
eircuinstance% in whicht * court. a sumnig it i5 possessed of the power to act. ough to act along the ltnes
suggested by the Marte and Vorthrop eas. Court-appointed management alm raises lhmme qer.tici cmce -
itg the imp wC of imipendikt, outside directom ot the behavior of large, publicly held corporationt, po iculnly
i reLation to compliance with Fideral seeurities laws and the fiducl~ary dutic-s of the rdepesdent dirctor to
shactioiders.
It is ioteresttg to tote thai it term-of Ite hew cases tit which the defer dnt w)rVntioa rtesed to ccnt to aoeitLea seti
of re tnstauring ate boud of director the curt, aftcr full itition. granted an in ,ietio n bist refied to grant the
ancillary xilfe S, rC v, Falstaff Brewing Coqp,, [1978 Transrer Iinderl Fles. S.' L. Rt,', (CHt) 96,5 (D.Dt C,
Ort, 2. J976), fd 629 F I2d 62 C fiC. O 1940), In mimiTsn torinichtire the hoard, aloint itsdstftden director, or
appoint a audit Coimittee, Distric Judge Gesell comrented: "fTihe Cout should not, without eonsklctdes jsturia-
jion, impose a remdy which would in effect W-gulie areas traditinrlly left to iotreon; ¢orponste Itsssitgemeot
66r rMMara C., 'Wpra note 56,
67, GT&E Case, as ip role 59,
68, See, e,g., Report on the Special tmv¢tigativu Ciduceed by the Audi( Cosrniw e ta ir B ard of DOteetor of
General Tcelphpou & l&ecteoess Coiporarion (March 4, 1976), des'sibed St OT&E s proxy naniats March T5, 176.
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ble only to the special committee. The results of the investigation would be embodied in a
report to the special committee which would also be shared with the SEC staff.
As the benefits of this method of investigation became apparent, the SEC began to
encourage corporations to come forward voluntarily and perform the same type of in-
dependent investigation that the consent decrees had required. This effort to induce
corporate self-investigation became known as the voluntary disclosure program.
69
The court summarized the four major steps required by participation in the SEC's
"voluntary program."
First, a corporation's board of directors should declare an end to all payments of doubtful
legality and practices involving maintenance of inaccurate books and records. Second, the
board should authorize a special committee composed primarily of independent directors
to perform a thorough investigation of the corporation's practices, using independent
counsel and auditors to prepare a report for the full board. Third, information on the
commencement and progress of the investigation should be lodged with the SEC on its
Form 8-K, and a copy of the final report should be filed with the SEC. Fourth, "[i]t must
be understood that the staff of the Commission will have access to any information that is
discovered or developed during the investigation." In return for such corporate coopera-
tion, the SEC offered leniency for past abuses and a chance to avoid extended formal
investigation and litigation. A report filed with the Senate Banking Committee in May
1976 provided details of roughly 60 corporations' compliance with the voluntary dis-
closure program.
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An example of a voluntary internal corporate investigation prior to SEC enforce-
ment action is the Diversified Industries case. 71 In 1974 and 1975, while engaged in a
proxy fight encompassing two pieces of private litigation, it came to light that Diver-
sified Industries may have engaged in commercial bribery by paying purchasing
agents of customers from a slush fund maintained at the corporation. The proxy
litigation was settled quickly and rather amicably. In the spring of 1975, prior to any
SEC enforcement action, my law firm (Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering) was retained by
Diversified's Board of Directors to conduct an internal investigation of the com-
mercial bribery allegations so the company could take appropriate steps to put its
house in order. The investigation was completed, and a detailed report was submitted
69. In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793, 800 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (footnote omitted).
70. Id. at 801 (footnote omitted). Professor Coffee commented:
Faced with a potentially enormous number of companies that had made such payments, and thus a severe burden
on its enforcement resources, the Commission instead inaugurated in the summer of 1975 its Voluntary
Disclosure Program. Under it, companies making voluntary "generic" disclosures of the aggregate amount and
basic purposes of questionable payments (and agreeing to take other remedial steps) could escape both the
constraints of a consent order injunction and the embarrassment of having to make public the delicate details of
who got what, when, and why. The combined effect of the SEC's approach was a carrot-and-stick policy: the
ability to make a "generic" disclosure rather than a full scale public confession constituted the "carrot," with
the "stick" being the Enforcement Division's increasingly restrictive consent decree. Unquestionably, it work-
ed. The SEC's initiation of this differentiated policy triggered a deluge of corporate disclosures involving
several hundred companies.
Coffee, supra note 42, at 1117 (footnotes omitted).
71. See Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1978) (en bane); see also SEC v. Diversified
Indus., Inc., SEC Lit. Release No. 7650 (D.D.C. Nov. 15, 1976) at 10 SEC Docket No. 19 at 980 (Nov. 30, 1976), SEC
Lit. Release No. 7722 (D.D.C. Dec. 30, 1976) at 11 SEC Docket No. 6 at 1400 (Jan. 18, 1977), SEC Lit. Release No.
8020 (D.D.C. July 7, 1977) at 12 SEC Docket No. 12 at 1443 (July 19, 1977), SEC Lit. Release No. 8640 (D.D.C. Jan.
11, 1979) at 16 SEC Docket No. 11 at 753 (Jan. 23, 1979) [hereinafter cited as Diversified Case].
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to the Board in December 1975. An SEC consent injunctive decree was entered in
this matter almost a year later in late 1976. But the internal investigation was quite
helpful to the company in negotiating the subsequent consent decree and alleviated
the necessity of the SEC seeking broad, restrictive ancillary relief. 2 Of course, the
report of the investigation was provided to the SEC when the report was subpoenaed
in the private SEC investigation.
The Diversified case has become well-known because in later private litigation,
the issue arose whether the report had to be produced to Diversified's adversaries or
whether it was shielded by the company's attorney-client and work-product privi-
leges. A panel of the Eighth Circuit found that members of my firm were acting as
investigators, not lawyers, and held that no privilege attached. 73 On rehearing, how-
ever, the Eighth Circuit en banc held that we were lawyers performing legal services
and sustained the privilege .7  The court en banc held that providing the report to the
SEC in a private investigation pursuant to subpoena did not waive the attorney-client
and work-product privileges for all purposes. The court, thus, denied the plaintiff's
discovery of the documents on the grounds of attorney-client privilege.7 ' This "lim-
ited waiver" theory of the attorney-client privilege espoused in Diversified has been
very controversial and has not been followed by other circuits. 76 Nevertheless, the
Diversified case highlights the importance of the language in the original retainer
letter of special counsel and in the corporate resolution authorizing and directing
counsel to conduct the investigation if the company expects to have any chance for
any portion of a special investigation to be protected by the attorney-client and
work-product privileges.
77
The passage of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 197778 (FCPA) assured that
internal corporate investigations would not be merely an interim phenomenon to get
72. Diversified Case, supra note 71.
73. Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 603 (8th Cir. 1977).
74. Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 610 (8th Cir. 1977) (en banc).
75. Id. at 611.
76. See, e.g., United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530, 538-42 (5th Cir. 1982) (corporation's blanket assertion of
the privilege rejected); In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793, 823-25 (D.C. Cit. 1982) (court rejected "limited waiver"
doctrine but nonetheless ordered only limited disclosure); In re John Doe Corp., (Southland Corp.), 675 F.2d 482, 487-89
(2d Cir. 1982) (corporation waived privilege by using materials for purposes other than seeking legal advice); Permian
Corp. v. United States, 665 F.2d 1214, 1220-22 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (narrow construction of privilege not overridden by
need to accommodate SEC); compare In re LTV Sec. Litig., 89 F.R.D. 595 (N.D. Tex. 1981); see also Block & Barton,
Securities Litigation-Waiver of the Attorney-Client Privilege by Disclosure to the SEC, 10 SEc. REG. L.J. 170, 173-75
(1982); Gruenbaum & Oppenheimer, Special Investigative Counsel: Conflicts and Roles, 33 RUTGERS L. REv. 865
(1981); Note, The Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege-A Compromise Solution: Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 11
CONN. L. REV. 94 (1978); Note, Limited Waiver of the Attorney-Client Privilege Upon Voluntary Disclosure to the SEC,
50 FORDHAM L. REV. 963 (1982); Note, Attorney-Client Privilege- Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith: New Rules For
Applying the Privilege When the Client Is A Corporation, 57 N.C.L. REV. 306 (1979); Comment, The Attorney-Client
Privilege, the Self-Evaluative Report Privilege, and Diversified Industries, Inc. v. Meredith, 40 OHIo ST. L.J. 699
(1979); Note, Discovery ofInternal Corporate Investigations, 32 STAN. L. REV. 1163 (1980); Comment, Stuffing the
Rabbit Back Into the Hat: Limited Waiver of the Attorney-Client Privilege in an Administrative Agency Investigation, 130
U. PA. L. REV. 1198 (1982); see also Crisman & Mathews, Limited Waiver of Attorney-Client Privilege and Work-
Product Doctrine in Internal Corporate Investigations: An Emerging Corporate "Self-Evaluative" Privilege, 21 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 123 (1983).
77. See, e.g., Block & Barton, Internal Corporate Investigations: Maintaining the Confidentiality of a Corporate
Client's Communications with Investigative Counsel, 35 Bus. LAW. 5, 9-13 (1979); Fedders, Corporate Criminal
Responsibility-Conducting an Internal Investigation, 3 CRIM. DEF. TECHS. (MB) ch. 62, at § 62.02[2] (1983).
78. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(b)(2), 78m(b)(3), 78dd-1, 78dd-2 (1982).
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corporate America through the SEC foreign payments program in the 1970s. The
FCPA virtually guaranteed that internal corporate investigations would become an
accepted part of American corporate life in the 1980s. Compliance with both the
books and records and internal accounting controls provisions of Section 10279 and
the anti-bribery provisions of Sections 103 and 104 of the FCPA has required hun-
dreds of companies to utilize inside and outside accountants and auditors as well as
inside and outside lawyers to conduct a wide variety of internal inquiries and in-
vestigations. In my view, no statute since the 1933 and 1934 Acts themselves has
done more to effect corporate accountability by public companies than the FCPA.
Also, corporate internal investigations of one kind or another have been a mainstay in
achieving such corporate accountability.
An example of an internal corporate investigation minimizing the brunt of an
eventual SEC enforcement action is the Playboy case." Playboy was a corporate
perks case involving disclosure violations and violations of the books and records
provisions of the FCPA. 81 The corporation hired Al Sommer, then at my firm, and
Steve Black (my partner who in 1983 directed the massive OPM bankruptcy trustee
investigation) to conduct an internal corporate investigation on behalf of the Audit
Committee. That self-investigation formed the predicate for settling the ultimate SEC
enforcement action in an administrative, rather than civil injunctive, forum.8 2
If one ruminates on the quick review of fifteen years of SEC enforcement cases
bearing upon internal corporate investigations (from VTR in 1965 to Playboy in
1980), an important developmental trend is highlighted: The internal corporate in-
vestigation began as an involuntary, SEC-imposed, court-supervised, public corpo-
rate enema to flush out corporate wrongdoing, usually governed by the ancillary
relief provisions of an SEC civil injunctive consent decree. But the internal corporate
investigation has evolved principally into a voluntary, self-controlled, private, more
preventive corporate tool or vehicle, to assure proper corporate accountability and to
attempt to avoid governmental enforcement action. At this point, let us reflect on why
a corporation might choose to conduct an internal self-investigation and on what
reasons exist that might lead a board of directors not to do so.
VI. PROS AND CONS OF AN INTERNAL CORPORATE INVESTIGATION
A. Factors in Favor
First, to fulfill their statutory duty to manage the corporation in compliance with
the law and for the benefit of the shareholders, directors need information. 83 When a
79. See Goelzer, The Accounting Provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act-The Federalization of Corporate
Recordkeeping and Internal Control, 5 J. CORP. L. 1 (1979); Sommer, Internal Controls, 61 N.C.L. REv. 505 (1983).
80. In re Playboy Enterprises Inc., [1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 82,635 (SEC Aug. 13.
1980).
81. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(b)(2)-(3), 78dd-1, 78dd-2 (1982).
82. In re Playboy Enterprises Inc., [1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. RE'. (CCH) 82,635 at 83,421-22 (SEC
Aug. 13, 1980).
83. In my experience, in great part due to the SEC's enforcement program in the 1970s and the passage of the FCPA,
the American business community is no longer plagued with yesteryear's problem of directors who don't direct. See also
Sporkin, SEC Enforcement and the Corporate Boardroom, 61 N.C.L. REv. 455 (1982); Compare Douglas. Directors
Who Don't Direct. 47 HARV. L. REv. 1305 (1934), with Small, The Evolving Role of the Director in Corporate
Governance, 30 HASUNsGs L. REv. 1353 (1979).
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company has multifaceted, worldwide operations, an internal investigation of certain
trouble spots may be necessary to give both management and the board the necessary
facts to determine whom to hire or fire, whom to promote or demote, what activities
to divest or terminate and what modifications in business practice or activity to adopt
or promote. Objective fact gathering often requires a noninvolved, disinterested fact
gatherer. Since it appears that serious corporate misconduct typically occurs at lower
levels of corporate management, often far below the board of directors and chief
operating officer, high level executives need the benefit of internal investigations to
react to and halt repeated misconduct. 4 When more senior officers or employees are
involved, independence of the inquiry is important for other reasons.
Second, an internal self-investigation is less painful than a government in-
vestigation. I have articulated over the years a set of fourteen "Rules of Thumb in
Defending SEC Investigations." My Second Rule is:
Rule Two: Take control of the investigation-get the SEC out as quickly as possible.
a. Obviously, neither defense counsel nor his clients should engage in sharp tactics
that smack of obstruction of justice, but within acceptable legal and ethical
bounds, counsel should influence as much as possible the speed and scope of the
investigation.
b. If necessary, have the client offer to investigate itself, or to have an independent
special counsel conduct the investigation. The goal is to have a nonprosecutorial
person, rather than a government enforcement agency, conduct whatever in-
vestigation is required.8 5
I can think of few cases in which a corporation's interests would be better served by
enduring an adversarial governmental investigation directed by the legion of zealous
enforcement lawyers Stanley Sporkin left behind at the SEC than by an internal
self-investigation controlled by a committee of the corporation's own board of direc-
tors who-unlike government lawyers-can always be guided by a good faith ex-
ercise of the business judgment rule. I do concede, however, that the self-
investigation may, in the short run, be more costly to the corporation in terms of legal
fees than allowing the government to expend its resources in the investigation.
Third, compliance with the FCPA, particularly the books and records and in-
ternal accounting controls provisions of Section 102,86 often will require an internal
investigation by internal or external auditors or inside or outside counsel.87 Such
84. Professor Coffee, in his thought-provoking article, Beyond the Shut-Eyed Sentry: TowardA Theoretical View of
Corporate Misconduct and an Effective Legal Response, 63 VA. L. REV. 1099 (1977), points out:
The SEC Payments Report suggests that corporate misconduct typically occurs at a much lower level within the
corporate hierarchy than the senior executive suite. While in some cases the chief executive's office did direct
the payments program (e.g., Gulf, Lockheed, United Brands, and Northrop), this pattern typifies only the
minority of the cases. Of the first 89 cases studied by the SEC, top management had knowledge in only 40 cases
(or 47%) .... Similarly, a survey by the House Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations found a 40%
figure to characterize the 25 additional companies they investigated.
Coffee, supra note 46 at 1105 n.1 I; see also SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON
INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 94TH CONG., 2D SFsS., FEDERAL REGULATION AND REGULATORY REFORM
33-42, 51-53 (Subcomm. Print 1976); SENATE BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS COMM., 94TH CONG., 2D
SEss., REPORT OF THE SECURmES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION ON QUESTIONABLE AND ILLEGAL CORPORATE PAYMENTS
AND PRACTICES (Comm. Print 1976).
85. Mathews, The Role of Outside Counsel, 61 N.C.L. REV. 483, 501 (1983) (emphasis added).
86. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2) (1982).
87. See Comment, Corporate Self-Investigations Under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 803
(1980).
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FCPA compliance inquiries are akin to antitrust compliance reviews that major cor-
porations have been undertaking for at least the last twenty-five years since the
electrical equipment industry's major price-fixing conspiracy in the late 1950s.88
Fourth, an internal self-investigation, if careful, thorough, and independent, may
provide the board of directors with a solid basis for terminating or settling favorably
derivative suits or class actions respecting the corporate problems investigated.
B. Factors Against
First, if confidentiality of the investigative work product cannot be maintained,
the corporation by conducting an investigation merely may be building a case on
behalf of the company's private or governmental adversaries, against the corpora-
tion's interest and the interests of its shareholders. Second, depending on what
corporate skeletons are turned up, in light of the company's disclosure obligations
under the federal securities laws, the company by investigating may be forced to
make more negative disclosures than it otherwise would, thereby injuring its
shareholders. In addition, the information uncovered, if publicized, may embarrass
or physically endanger employees, agents, or other involved individuals and may
cause existing or potential customers to shift their business to the company's com-
petitors. 89 Indeed, in the foreign payments cases, the publicity even toppled foreign
governments. For example, former Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka likely became a
"former" prime minister for conduct that just recently resulted in his criminal con-
viction for taking bribes in the Lockheed scandal. 90
Third, major investigations by outside counsel and independent accounting
firms are expensive. Consequently, in some cases in which I have represented small-
er, financially insecure companies, I have advised them not to conduct an internal
investigation and instead to let the SEC expend its budget in developing the facts.
Fourth, particularly in domestic or foreign payments matters, the self-investigation
may turn up facts requiring the company to amend its prior tax returns and may
trigger an IRS investigation 91 or other adverse regulatory action. 92 Fifth, as demon-
strated hereafter in this article in a discussion of the Southland Corporation case,
93
the methodology and results of a private internal corporate investigation may subse-
88. See, e.g., Klingsberg, Internal Corporate Antitrust Investigations, in PRACTISiNG LAW INSTrrufE, supra note 2,
at 11; see also Whiting, Antitrust and the Corporate Executive, 47 VA. L. REv. 929 (1961); Whiting, Antitrust and The
Corporate Executive-Part II, 48 VA. L. REv. 1 (1962). Cf. Pickholz, Confronting SEC Pressure: A Need for Legal
Audits, Legal Times of Wash., Oct. 29, 1979, at 14-15.
89. See SEC v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 404 F. Supp. 651, 652 (D.D.C. 1975).
90. See Lehner & Martin, Tanaka Trial's End Portends Turmoil: Impact on Japanese Politics Depends on the
Public's Reaction, Wall St. J., Oct. 13, 1983, at 33 col. 2; Lehner, Tanaka Guilty of Taking Bribe From Lockheed-
Former Prime Minister Gets 4-Year Term and Is Fined $2.2 Million by Japan Court, Wall St. J., Oct. 12, 1983, at 2, col.
2.
91. See, e.g., Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981); see also United States v. Lipshy, 492 F. Supp. 35
(N.D. Tex. 1979) (IRS inquiry involving internal investigation of Zale Corporation); cf. SEC v. Zale Corp., 650 F.2d 718
(5th Cir. 1981).
92. For example, admissions made in the report of investigation in General Tire Case formed a basis for the FrC's
refusal to renew valuable broadcast licenses for General Tire's RKO television subsidiary. See RKO Gen., Inc. v. FCC,
670 F.2d 215 (D.C. Cir. 198 1); General Tire Case, supra note 48; Report of the Special Review Committee of the Board
of Directors of the General Tire & Rubber Company (July 1, 1977).
93. See infra notes 135-99 and accompanying text.
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quently become the subjects of vicious second-guessing in the public media. Thus,
there are pros and cons to everything in corporate as well as human life. 94
VII. ROLE OF INTERNAL INVESTIGATIONS IN AFFECTING TERMINATION OR
SETTLEMENT OF DERIVATIVE Surrs: THE GT&E EXAMPLE
The SEC's sensitive foreign payments enforcement program, supplemented by
the prior domestic political slush fund cases and the subsequent domestic commercial
payments and corporate perks cases, sometimes collectively called the Commission's
management fraud enforcement program, 95 led to the development of another body of
law that illuminated the significance of internal corporate investigations. I refer to the
recently revitalized body of law respecting dismissal or settlement of stockholder
derivative suits through application of the business judgment rule based upon the
results of an independent corporate internal investigation. My friend Don Schwartz is
much more expert than I in discussing this developing field of law. 9 6 I shall just
scratch the surface.
The illegal domestic political campaign contribution cases spawned a few well-
known stockholders derivative suits.97 The sensitive foreign payments cases acceler-
ated the pace of derivative suit litigation as well as class actions for damages.
98
94, See Morvillo, Voluntary Corporate In-House Investigations-Benefits and Pitfalls, 36 Bus. LAW. 1871 (1981).
95. See Freeman, The Legality of the SEC's Management Fraud Program, 31 Bus. LAW. 1295 (1976); see also
Sommer, The Disclosure of Management Fraud, 31 Bus. LAw. 1283 (1976).
96, See Arsht, The Business Judgment Rule Revisited, 8 HoFSRA L. REv. 93 (1979); Block & Barton, The Business
Judgment Rule as Applied to Stockholder Proxy Derivative Suits Under the Securities Exchange Act, 8 SEC. REG. L.J. 99
(1980); Block & Prussin, Termination of Derivative Suits Against Directors on Business Judgment Grounds: From Zapata
to Aronson, 39 Bus. LAW. 1504 (1984); Coffee & Schwartz, The Survival of the Derivative Suit: An Evaluation and a
Proposal For Legislative Reform, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 261 (1981); Dent, The Power of Directors to Terminate Sharehold-
er Litigation: The Death of The Derivative Suit? 75 Nw. U.L. REv. 96 (1980); Estes, Corporate Governance in the
Courts, 4 HARv. Bus. REv. 50 (1980); Steinberg, The Use of Special Litigation Committees to Terminate Shareholder
Derivative Suits, 35 U. MiAMI L. REv. 1 (1980); Veasay, New Insights Into Judicial Deference to Directors' Business
Decisions: Should We Trust the Courts? 39 Bus. LAW. 1461 (1984); Comment, Special Litigation Committees-An
Expanding and Potent Threat to Shareholder Derivative Suits, 2 CARDozo L. REV. 169 (1980); Note, The Business
Judgment Rule in Derivative Suits Against Directors, 65 CORNELL L. REv. 600 (1980); Note, The Propriety of Judicial
Deference to Corporate Boards of Directors, 96 HARV. L. REv. 1894 (1983); Pitt & Israel, Recent Cases Chart Use of
Business Judgment Rule, Legal Times of Wash., Jan. 19, 1981 at 33; Buxbaum, "Maldonado" Cases Could Lock
Shareholders' Door, Legal Times of Wash., Oct. 13, 1980, at 1; Hinsey, Maldonado (NY) v. Maldonado (Del.): Which
Prevails? Legal Times of Wash., Aug. 4, 1980, at 1.
97. E.g., Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975); cf. Miller v. American Tel. & Tel. Corp., 507 F.2d 759 (3d Cir. 1974).
98. See, e.g., Abbey v. Control Data Corp., 603 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1979); Cramer v. General Tel. & Elecs. Corp.,
582 F.2d 259 (3d Cir. 1978); Rosengarten v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 466 F. Supp. 817 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); cf.
Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471 (1979) (disinterested directors permitted to terminate stockholders' derivative suit against
other directors in certain circumstances); Levy v. Johnson, [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
95,899 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 15, 1977); Lewis v. Elam, 11977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,013
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 5, 1977); Gall v. Exxon Corp., 418 F. Supp. 508 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Meer v. United Brands Co.,
[1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,648 (S.D.N.Y. July 6, 1976); Auerbach v. Bennett (GT&E),
47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994,419 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979); Parkoff v. General Tel. & Elecs. Corp., 74 A.D.2d 762,425
N.Y.S.2d 599 (1980), aff'd 53 N.Y.2d 412, 425 N.E.2d 820, 442 N.Y.S.2d 432 (1981); Shaw v. Jamieson (Exxon), 55
A.D.2d 875, 390 N.Y.S.2d 111 (1977). See generally Gaines v. Haughton, 645 F.2d 761 (9th Cir. 1981); Johnson v.
Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287 (3d Cir. 1980); Galef v. Alexander, 615 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1980) (dismissal of derivative suit
under business judgment rule left to state law); Lewis v. Anderson, 615 F.2d 778 (9th Cir. 1979) (duly delegated
committee exercising good faith business judgment, may terminate derivative action); Genzer v. Cunningham, 498 F.
Supp. 682 (E.D. Mich. 1980) (thorough and good faith investigation by special litigation committee sufficient to reach
determination to terminate derivative suit); Maldonado v. Flynn (1), 485 F. Supp. 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), modified 671
F.2d 729 (2d Cir. 1982); Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981) (review of independent and good faith
committee's decision to terminate derivative action left to business judgment of state court).
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The GT&E case is an example of how an internal corporate investigation can
dilute the harshness of an expected SEC enforcement action and help dispose of
problems arising in subsequent derivative and class action lawsuits.9 9 In the midst of
the SEC sensitive foreign payments enforcement program in the mid-1970s, GT&E
became one of the multinational corporations whose foreign payments were desig-
nated for scrutiny by the SEC. GT&E determined that it would be more advantageous
to conduct and control as much of the investigation as possible than merely to submit
to wholesale, harsh, governmental investigation. (Remember Rule Two of Rules of
Thumb in Defending SEC Investigations. 100)
The SEC Enforcement staff, at the time strained beyond the limits of its avail-
able enforcement personnel in attempting to juggle over 100 multinational in-
vestigations, agreed to defer for a few months pursuit of its investigation of GT&E in
return for the company's promise to have its audit committee-utilizing outside
counsel (my firm) not previously affiliated with the company--conduct a com-
prehensive internal corporate investigation of GT&E's worldwide foreign payments
activities. The price of this deferral of SEC investigation was GT&E's commitment
to provide the SEC access to all the underlying work product amassed in the internal
investigation. Also, of course, GT&E was required to pledge that its internal in-
vestigation would be done quickly and not be a dilatory attempt to forestall the SEC's
enforcement inquiry.
Care was paramount at the start! Only by a very cautious structuring of the
nature, scope, and procedures of the investigation would the company be assured of
the maximum advantage of a very costly endeavor. The investigation was conducted
on behalf of the audit committee of GT&E's board of directors. To assure
independence-a necessary ingredient if the results of the investigation were to be
used in the future as a basis for the board of directors' bona fide business judgment in
taking or declining to pursue any particular corporate action-the audit committee
was restructured at the start to include only independent directors who had no prior
role in any of the company's foreign payments activities. Only by assuring that the
audit committee included no members of management or the board who may have
approved-or failed to inquire about-questionable foreign payments, could the in-
tegrity of the investigation be preserved.
The eventual investigative report of the GT&E audit committee disclosed a great
deal of information about sensitive or questionable foreign payments in a number of
countries, totalling millions of dollars. While the report was quite generic, it did
address with specificity the roles of various members of management and to what
degree, if any, they participated or authorized the foreign payments discussed. The
payments report was publicly disclosed in GT&E's SEC filings.
While the internal investigation was very useful, it was not a panacea. The SEC
99. Cramer v. General Tel. & Elecs. Corp., 582 F.2d 259 (3d Cir. 1978); GT&E Case, supra note 59; Parkoff v.
General Tel. & Elecs. Corp., 74 A.D.2d 762, 425 N.Y.S.2d 599 (1980), aff'd 53 N.Y.2d 412, 425 N.E.2d 820, 442
N.Y.S.2d 432 (1981); see also Auerbach v. Bennett (GT&E), 47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920
(1979); Note, The Effect ofResJudicata on Shareholder Derivative Actions in New York: Parkoff v. General Telephone &
Electronics Corp., 47 ALB. L. REv. 145 (1982).
100. See supra note 85 and accompanying text; see also Mathews, supra note 85, at 484-86.
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did thereafter conduct a somewhat limited investigation-after the Enforcement staff
had reviewed our investigative work product in detail-to assure that the audit com-
mittee investigation was reliable and complete and not a whitewash. The SEC also
required GT&E to consent to a civil injunctive decree in a subsequent enforcement
action. 1O1 However, the consent decree was less harsh than it would have been absent
the internal investigation. Only the corporation-no individuals-were named as
defendants. No further mandated investigation was to be monitored by the SEC,
supervised by the court, and conducted by a special counsel whose choice would be
influenced by the SEC and who would look to the SEC rather than the company for
instructions. The cosmetics and language of the payments report were shaped by the
company's own audit committee, not by the SEC Enforcement staff or an in-
dependent outside counsel directly influenced by the government enforcement
agency.
After the SEC settlement, a shareholder brought a derivative suit against certain
GT&E directors and the company's outside auditors, alleging breach of their duties to
the corporation in connection with the foreign payments activities. This is known as
the Auerbach case. 102 GT&E immediately appointed a Special Litigation Committee
(SLC) composed of three independent directors who had not been directors at the
time the foreign payments were made, had no knowledge of or participation in the
payments activities, and were not named as defendants in the derivative suit. 10 3 The
board of directors of GT&E delegated to the SLC complete authority to determine
what course of action the company should pursue respecting the derivative suit and
other suits that had been or were subsequently filed.
The SLC immediately retained yet another independent counsel, former New
York Court of Appeals Chief Judge Desmond, to advise it in determining how to deal
with the derivative claim.104 The SLC and its eminent special counsel pursued an
inquiry which included:
(1) The review of the prior audit committee investigation.
(2) A test of its completeness by interviewing the audit committee's investigative
counsel.
(3) Review of relevant transcripts of testimony before the SEC and a study of documents
collected during the prior investigation.
(4) Interviews with directors found to have participated in any way in the underlying
transactions.
(5) Questionnaires completed by nonmanagement directors.'0 5
Based upon the advice of its counsel and its own independent business judgment, the
101. GT&E Case, supra note 59.
102. Auerbach v. Bennett (GT&E), 47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979).
103. In this respect, GT&E was following the example of the SEC-and court-approved Litigation and Claims
Committee of the Board in the Mattel case. See SEC v. Mattel, Inc., [1974 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 94,754 (D.D.C. Aug. 8, 1974).
104. In several other cases, an eminent retired jurist has effectively been retained to serve as independent special
counsel to advise a board of directors or a special board committee on how to deal with a derivative suit. See, e.g., Abbey
v. Control Data Corp., 603 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1979) (retired Chief Judge Fuld of New York Court of Appeals); Gall v.
Exxon Corp., 418 F. Supp. 508 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (retired Chief Justice Weintraub of New Jersey Supreme Court).
105. Block & Jasinski, Involuntary Dismissal of Derivative Actions Under the Business Judgment Rule, in PRACrts-
tNG LAw INsrrrun , supra note 2, at 175.
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SLC determined that continued prosecution of the Auerbach derivative suit and other
related suits would not be in the best interests of the corporation. 10 6
The dismissal of the Auerbach derivative action ultimately was sustained by the
New York courts as a good faith exercise of independent business judgment by the
SLC on behalf of GT&E's full board of directors.'0 7 The pivotal factor in sustaining
the dismissal was the nature and quality of the underlying investigations-both the
audit committee internal investigation and the independent review by the SLC.'08
But the Auerbach suit was not the end of GT&E's foreign payments problems.
Two other GT&E shareholders brought derivative suits. The Cramer suit was brought
in federal court.' 9 The Parkoff suit, like Auerbach, was brought in the New York
state courts. "0 A third shareholder, Limmer, brought a class action for damages in
federal court."' And additional shareholders brought a second class action for dam-
ages in federal court, the Ross suit.1
2
Subsequent to the dismissal of the Auerbach suit by the trial court in New York,
the federal court dismissed the Cramer suit based upon res judicata.1 3 The United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania concluded that the New
York state court judgment in Auerbach barred Cramer's claims even though the
106. See Auerbach v. Bennett (GT&E), 47 N.Y.2d 619, 625-26, 393 N.E.2d 994, 997,419 N.Y.S.2d 920, 923-24
(1979).
107. The emerging law of when, and under what circumstances, a board of directors can dismiss a derivative suit is
outside the scope of this article. A convenient starting point is Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471 (1979). An excellent
analysis of Burks and its progeny is provided in Coffee & Schwartz, supra note 96. Professors Schwartz and Coffee
describe the Auerbach (GT&E) derivative litigation as follows:
Auerbach involved the familiar pattern of foreign bribes and kickbacks, paid in this instance by General
Telephone & Electronics Corporation to foreign governmental customers. The decision not to sue was reached
by a committee of three directors who had joined the board after the transactions in question. The trial court
granted defendant's motion for summary judgment, based on this decision. See Auerbach v. Bennett (GT&E),
64 A.D.2d 98, 103, 408 N.Y.S.2d 83, 85 (1978). The Appellate Division reversed, holding simply that
summary judgment would require a fuller statement of the factors relied upon by the committee and the relative
weight accorded them. Specifically, it asked the board to develop 'the reasons for the payments, the advantages
or disadvantages accruing to the corporation by reason of the transactions, the extent of the participation or
profit by the respondent directors and the loss, if any, of public confidence in the corporation which might be
incurred." Id. at 107, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 87-88. Reversing the Appellate Division, the New York Court of
Appeals stated that such information was unnecessary because substantive judicial review of a beard's decision
was unavailable. Auerbach v. Bennett (GT&E), 47 N.Y.2d 619, 633, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1002, 419 N.Y.S.2d
920, 928 (1979). Then, in a broad conclusory statement, it justified this rule: "To permit judicial probing of
such issues would be to emasculate the business judgment doctrine as applied to the actions and determinations
of the special litigation committee. Its substantive evaluation of the problems posed and its judgment in their
resolution are beyond our reach." Id. at 634, 393 N.E.2d at 1002, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 928.
Id. at 278 (footnotes omitted). Compare the Auerbach result with the result in the Second Circuit's opinion applying
Connecticut law in Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1498 (1983). See also Hasan v.
CleveTrust Realty Investors, [1983-1984 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCII) 99,704 (6th Cir. Mar. 2, 1984);
Holmstromv. Coastal Indus., Inc., [1983-1984 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 91,486 (N.D. Ohio May 30,
1984); In re Continental I1l. See. Litig., [1983-1984 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 99,680 (N.D. Ill. May
6, 1983).
108. Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 634-36, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1003-04, 419 N.Y.2d 920, 929-30 (1979).
109. Cramer v. General Tel. & Elees. Corp., 443 F. Supp. 516 (E.D. Pa. 1977), affd, 582 F.2d 259 (3d Cir. 1978).
110. Parkoff v. General Tel. & Elecs. Corp., 53 N.Y.2d 412, 425 N.E.2d 820, 442 N.Y.S.2d 432 (1981).
111. Limmer v. General Tel. & Elecs. Corp., [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. RE'. (CCH) 96,111
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 21, 1977).
112. Ross v. Warner, [1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,735 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 11, 1980).
113. Cramer v. GeneralTel. & Elecs. Corp., 443 F. Supp. 516 (E.D. Pa. 1977), affd, 582 F.2d 259 (3d Cir. 1978).
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Cramer complaint contained much broader allegations than the Auerbach com-
plaint. 114
Thereafter, the New York Court of Appeals sustained dismissal of the Parkoff
complaint. "5 Strange as it may seem, the court held that the Auerbach and Parkoff
complaints encompassed separate and distinct events and underlying activities that
did not constitute parts of a single transaction. In addition, Parkoff's attempt to
intervene in the Auerbach litigation had been refused. Thus, it found that the Au-
erbach judgment did not bar the Parkoff complaint. However, the court found the
Cramer and Parkoff complaints to encompass identical claims. And Parkoff had not
attempted to intervene in the Cramer suit. Therefore, the court held that the federal
judgment dismissing Cramer barred the Parkoff suit on res judicata grounds, stating:
"While in our view the disposition of the Auerbach litigation is not conclusive as to
the Parkoff claims, for reasons which follow we reach a contrary result with respect
to the disposition of the derivative action commenced by stockholder Cramer."
116
After analyzing the Cramer complaint, the court held:
Inasmuch as these [Cramer] matters are also the substance of plaintiff Parkoff's com-
plaint, and because there has been no showing that he sought intervention and was
excluded from participation in that action (as happened in the Auerbach litigation), we
look to the disposition of the Cramer action and conclude that plaintiff is thereby barred
from prosecuting the action now before us."
7
The underpinning of the decision barring the Parkoff litigation was the court's find-
ings that: (i) the shareholder's action being given res judicata effect-i.e., Cramer-
was neither collusive nor fraudulent, (ii) the current plaintiff shareholder-i.e.,
Parkoff-was not frustrated in any attempt to join or intervene in the Cramer action
which went to judgment, and (iii) both actions-i.e., Cramer and Parkoff-arose out
of the same underlying transactions. 
8
The Limmer suit was eventually dismissed for failure to state a claim under the
federal securities laws and a consequent lack of pendent subject matter jurisdiction
over the state law claims asserted. 119 The Ross suit was eventually dismissed on
similar grounds.' 20
Needless to say, one of the principal underpinnings of the dismissals of all the
class and derivative litigation in the GT&E cases was the initial underlying internal
corporate investigation. When conducted with the requisite independence, the in-
vestigation was able to form a crucial basis for the exercise of independent business
judgment by the appropriate board committee. 12 1
114. Id. at 525; see also Note, The Effect of Res Judicata On Shareholder Derivative Actions in New York: Parkoff
v. General Telephone & Electronics Corp., 47 ALB. L. Rsv. 145, 152-54 (1982).
115. Parkoff v. General Tel. & Elecs. Corp., 53 N.Y.2d 412, 425 N.E.2d 820, 442 N.Y.S.2d 432 (1981).
116. Id., at 421,425 N.E.2d 820, 824, 442 N.Y.S.2d 432, 436 (1981); see also Note, supra note 114, at 154-57.
117. Parkoff v. General Tel. & Elecs. Corp., 53 N.Y.2d 412, 422, 425 N.E.2d 820, 825,442 N.Y.S.2d 432, 437
(1981).
118. Id., at 415-22, 425 N.E.2d at 821-28, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 433-40.
119. Limmer v. General Tel. & Elecs. Corp., [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,111
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 21, 1977).
120. Ross v. Warner, [1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,735 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 11, 1980).
121. But see, Abbey v. Computer & Communications Technology Corp., 457 A.2d 368 (Del. Ch. 1983) (corpora-
tion's board of directors may not appoint a disinterested special litigation committee to review the merits of a shareholder
derivative suit and then move independently for dismissal of the suit before the committee has made its recommenda-
tions).
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We should not leave the derivative suit problems without taking note of the
American Law Institute's ongoing Corporate Governance project. A substantial por-
tion of Tentative Draft No. 1 of the American Law Institute's Restatement of Princi-
ples of Corporate Governance and Structure is devoted to the subject of dealing with
derivative actions. 122 Section 7.03 of Tentative Draft No. I governs "Termination of
Derivative Action on the Basis of Board or Shareholder Action."1 23 Section 7.03b
states that if a derivative action names as a defendant any corporate fiduciary, good
corporate practice should lead the board to take a number of steps prior to determin-
ing that the action is adverse to the corporation's interests, including (i) delegating the
matter to a committee of independent directors; (ii) retaining an independent special
counsel to advise the committee with respect to the issues raised in the derivative
litigation; and (iii) having the committee conduct "an investigation into the disputed
events and transactions commensurate with the gravity and plausibility of the
claims," and prepare and distribute a written report of investigation to all interested
parties. 24 Thus, the American Law Institute's project would institutionalize the
internal investigation mechanism. 125
VIII. EMERGING PROBLEMS IN INTERNAL CORPORATE INVESTIGATIONS:
CONFIDENTIALITY AND INTEGRITY DISCLOSURE ISSUES
Internal investigations conducted by special committees of the board or by
special counsel pose a number of problems for both the corporation being in-
vestigated and for the special counsel conducting the investigation. Judge-made law
respecting internal investigations is gradually developing, but to date the courts have
not provided definitive or uniform guidance respecting many aspects of the conduct
or consequences of a special investigation. Moreover, different types of in-
vestigations have spawned both different problems and different solutions to the same
problem. For example, an investigation conducted by a special counsel pursuant to an
SEC consent decree may be governed by different rules and principles than an
internal investigation conducted for a board of directors in circumstances in which
there is no pending SEC enforcement action or no existing consent decree.
126
Gruenbaum and Oppenheimer have published a pertinent article discussing the
conflicts and roles of special investigative counsel who operate pursuant to the charter
of an SEC consent decree. 127 Some commentators who have performed the role of
122. RESTATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND STRUcTuRE § 7.01-.08 (Tent. Draft No. 1,
1982).
123. Id. § 7.03.
124. Id. §§ 7.03b(i)-b(iii).
125. See also id. § 7.03 comment a.
126. Compare Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1977) (Harper & Row test applicable to
determine extent of attorney-client privilege in investigation without SEC consent decree), and In re LTV Sec. Litig. 89
F.R.D. 595 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (corporation conducting independent investigation without an SEC order could assert
attorney-client privilege), with SEC v. Canadian Javelin Ltd., 451 F. Supp. 594 (D.D.C. 1978) (no attorney-client
privilege created in an investigation pursuant to an SEC consent decree), and Osterneck v. E.T. Barwick Indus., 82
F.R.D. 81 (N.D. Ga. 1979) (in an investigation pursuant to an SEC consent decree, attorneys who served as special
counsel ordered to testify and produce documents).
127. Gruenbaum & Oppenheimer, supra note 2.
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special counsel in a number of cases have outlined the vulnerability of special
counsel. 128 Block and Barton wrote a helpful article on procedures designed to
maintain the confidentiality of the work product and investigative record generated
and developed in an internal corporate investigation. 129 However, emerging case law
makes it almost impossible to guarantee privacy or confidentiality of the investigative
record. 130 Even in those cases in which confidentiality otherwise might be preserved
through a combined assertion of attomey-client privilege and work-product doctrine
supplemented by an argument for a corporate or business self-evaluative privilege, 13 1
the federal securities laws nevertheless might require that many of the facts and
128. See, e.g., Fedders, Investigative Counsel's Vulnerability, in PRACTISINO LAW INSTITrrTE, supra note 2, at 295;
Queenan, Conducting Internal Investigations, in A. LEVENSON, A. MATHEWS & H. PITT, FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES
AND INTERNAL ACCOUNTING CONTROLS 181 (1980); see also Fedders, Corporate Criminal Responsibility-Conducting
An Internal Investigation, 3 CRI, . DEF. TECHNIQUES (MB) ch. 62 (1983); Pitt, Special Investigative Counsel: Tile SEC's
Independent Police Force or Corporate Representatives? in 1 NEGOTIATING SEC CONSENT DECREES, supra note 2, at
142.
129. Block & Barton, Internal Corporate Investigations: Maintaining the Confidentiality of a Corporate Client's
Communications with Investigative Counsel, 35 Bus. LAW. 5 (1979).
130. See Continental I11. Sec. Litig., FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) No. 1072 (May 16, 1984); In re Sealed Case
(Tesoro Petroleum), 676 F.2d 793 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (documents prepared by corporations in-house counsel not protected
by work product privilege); In re John Doe Corp. (Southland Corp.), 675 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1982) (limiting attorney-client
privilege with regard to conversations with general counsel); see also United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530 (5th Cir.
1982); Permian Corp. v. United States, 665 F.2d 1214 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Weil v. Investment/Indicators, Research &
Management, Inc., 647 F.2d 18 (9th Cir. 1981); In re Special Sept. 1978 Grand Jury (11) (Jenner & Block), 640 F.2d 49
(7th Cir. 1980); Schnell v. Schnall (Saxon Indus.), 550 F. Supp. 650 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n v.
Shamrock Broadcasting Co., Inc., 521 F. Supp. 638 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); SEC v. Gulf & Western, 518 F. Supp. 675
(D.D.C. 1981); In re LTV Sec. Litig., 89 F.R.D. 595 (N.D. Tex. 1981); Byrnes v. IDS Realty Trust, 85 F.R.D. 679
(S.D.N.Y. 1980); Block & Barton, Securities Litigation-Waiver of the Attorney-Client Privilege by Disclosure to the
SEC, 10 SEC. REG. L.J. 170 (1982); Note, Limited Waiver of the Attorney-Client Privilege Upon Voluntary Disclosure to
the SEC, 50 FORDHAMt L. REv. 963 (1982); Comment, Stuffing tire Rabbit Back Into the Hat: Limited Waiver of the
Attorney-Client Privilege in an Administrative Agency Investigation, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1198 (1982); cf. In re In-
terational Sys. & Controls Corp. See. Litig., 693 F.2d 1235 (5th Cir. 1982) (sufficient anticipation of litigation triggers
work product immunity); Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981) (answers to questionnaires posed by investigat-
ing committee covered by attorey-client privilege); Block & Reinz, After "Upjohn": The Uncertain Confidentiality of
Corporate Internal Investigative Files, SECOND ANNUAL SECURITIES LAW & ENFORCEmENT INSTITUTE 403 (J. Fedders &
A. Mathews eds. 1983); Gergaez, Attorney-Corporate Client Privilege: Cases Applying Upjohn, Waiver, Crime Fraud
Exception and Related Issues, 38 Bus. LAW. 1653 (1983); Klein, Attorney-Client Privilege and Work-Product Doctrine
in the Corporate Context, in PRACTISING LAW INSTrIJT~E, THIRTEENTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES REGULATION
337 (hardcover ed. 1982); Mathews & Borow, The Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege and Work-Product Doctrine, in
THE CORPORATE COUNSELLOR'S DESK BOOK ch. 6, pp. 207-34 (Block, Hoddinott, & Epstein eds. 1982); Pitt, Preserving
Corporate Confidences: An Overview, in PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, THIRTEENTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES
REGULATION 323 (hardcover ed. 1982); Miller, Recent Appellate Rulings Analyzing Scope of Attorney-Client Privilege,
Nat'l L.J., Aug. 16, 1982, at 24.
131. See, e.g., Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1978) (en banc); In re LTV Sec. Litig.,
89 F.R.D. 595 (N.D. Tex. 1981); Crisman & Mathews, Limited Waiver of Corporate Attorney-Client and Work-Product
Privileges: An Emerging Corporate Self-Evaluative Privilege, 21 At. Cmt. L. REV. 123 (1983); Murphy, The Self-
Evaluative Privilege, 7 J. CORP. L. 490 (1982); Note, The Privilege of Self-Critical Analysis, 96 HARV. L. REv. 1083
(1983); Note, Discovery of Internal Corporate Investigations, 32 STAN. L. REV. 1163 (1980); Case Comment, Civil
Procedure: Self-Evaluative Reports-A Qualified Privilege in Discovery? 57 MINN. L. REV. 807 (1973). See also Hall,
Hospital Committee Proceedings and Reports: Their Legal Status, 1 AM. L.J. & MED. 245 (1975) (privilege for certain
internal hospital reports); Katz, Investigation and Conciliation of Employment Discrimination Charges Under Title VII:
Employers' Rights in an Adversary Process, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 877 (1977); Note, A Balanced Approach to Affirmative
Action Discovery in Title VII Suits, 32 HASTINGS L.J. 1013, 1024-31 (1981) ("public policy privilege"); Note, Govern-
ment Access to Corporate Documents and Auditors' Workpapers: Shall We Include Auditors Among the Privileged Few?
2 J. CORP. L. 349 (1977); Comment, Corporate Self-Investigations Under The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 47 U. CHI.
L. REV. 803 (1980); Comment, Access to EEOC Files Concerning Private Employers, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 477 (1979);
Comment, The Attorney-Client Privilege, the Self-Evaluative Report Privilege, and Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith,
40 OHIo ST. L.J. 699 (1979). Cf. United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 677 F.2d 211 (2d Cir. 1982), affid in part and
rev'd in part, 104 S. Ct. 1495 (1984).
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circumstances uncovered in the internal corporate investigation be publicly disclosed
in SEC filings.' 31 Because of the amorphous, confusing integrity of management and
related integrity theories of materiality, which the SEC sometimes advocates and to
which courts sometimes refer, the disclosure issues attending the conduct of an
internal corporate investigation can be the most sensitive, difficult issues with which
counsel must deal. 133
IX. RECENT ILLUSTRATIVE CASES: PUBLIC DIsCLOsuRE AND
INDEPENDENCE-SOUTHLAND, TESORO PETROLEUM, CITICORP,
AND ASHLAND OIL
Recent cases indicate that both investigating counsel and investigated corporate
client may be particularly susceptible to criticism in the press respecting two crucial
aspects of internal investigations, namely (1) whether the corporation made sufficient
public disclosure at the conclusion of the internal investigation, and (2) whether
counsel-and consequently the investigation itself-was sufficiently independent.
The recent publicity in four cases-Southland Corporation, Tesoro Petroleum, Citi-
corp, and Ashland Oil-dramatizes the pitfalls faced by reputable counsel and reput-
able client corporations in dealing with internal investigations. 134
A. Southland Corporation: In re John Doe Corp. 13
5
In November 1976, Southland Corporation, parent of the 7-Eleven convenience
store chain, was asked by the SEC to investigate whether there had been any
132. See, e.g., SEC v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 452 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Wis. 1978) (disclosure of activities
covered by internal investigation required on "integrity of management" theory of materiality); In re Carter and Johnson,
SEC Act Release No. 34-17597, [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,847 (SEC Feb. 28, 1981); In re
Keating, Muething & Klekamp, SEC Act Release No. 34-15982, [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1
82,124 (SEC July 2, 1979) (counsel may have duty to assure disclosure is complete in client's SEC filings); Bauman, Rule
lOb-5 and The Corporation's Affirmative Duty to Disclose, 67 GEo. L.J. 935 (1979); Bialkin, Legal and Practical
Considerations for Disclosure of the Results of an Internal Corporate Investigation, in PRACTISING LAW INSTrUT, supra
note 2, at 129; Fogelson, The Reporting Company's Duties to Disclose and Correct in the Absence of Trading; Timely
Disclosure of Negative Information, in SECOND ANNUAL SECURITIES LAW & ENFORCEMENT INSTITUTE 3 (J. Fedders & A.
Mathews eds. 1983); Mann, Disclosure of Results oflnvestigation, in PRACTISING LAW INTsrrTrU, supra note 2, at 107;
Sheffeg, Securities Law Responsibilities of Issuers to Respond to Rumors and Other Publicity: Reexamination of a
Continuing Problem, 57 NOTRE DAME LAW. 755 (1982).
133. See, e.g., Ferrara, Starr, & Steinberg, Disclosure of Information Bearing on Management Integrity and
Competency, 76 Nw. U.L. REv. 555 (1981); Longstreth, SEC Disclosure Policy Regarding Management Integrity, 38
Bus. LAW. 1413 (1983); Roiter, Illegal Corporate Practices and the Disclosure Requirements of the Federal Securities
Laws, 50 FORDHAM L. Rev. 781 (1982); Speech by John M. Fedders on Failure to Disclose Illegal Conduct, [July-Dec.]
14 SEC. REO. & L. REP. (BNA) 2057 (Nov. 26, 1982); Karmel, Speech, Qualitative and Differential Disclosure,
reprinted in PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTr, supra note 2, at 395.
134. See, e.g., Southland Corp. Investigations: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm.
on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. (June 28, 1983); Should Law Firms Investigate Their
Own Clients?. Bus. WK., July I1, 1983 at 59 (Citicorp, Southland, and Ashland); Fedders Denies Wrongdoing in
Southland Case, 83-125 SEC TODAY 1 (1983) (Statement of John Fedders) [hereinafter cited as Fedders Senate
statement]; Noble, Business and the Law "Investigations By Lawyers, N.Y. Times, Sept. 6, 1983, at D-2, col. I
(Citicorp, Southland, and Ashland); Vilkin, Fedders Doesn't Recall Key Events on Southland, Nat'l L.J., Aug. 29, 1983,
at 5; Arieff, Ethics Reviews Still Deemed Useful for Business. Legal Times of Wash., July 25, 1983, at 4 (Citicorp,
Southland, and Ashland); Arieff, SEC, Congress Question Counsel's Role in Review of Ashland Oil Payment, Legal
Times of Wash., May 30, 1983, at 1; Thornton, Chief Enforcerat SEC Subject of Jury Probe, Wash. Post, May 30, 1983,
at A-I, col. 6; Vilkin, Southland Case Raises Ethics Issue-Will Lawyers Testify?, Nat'l L.J., May 23, 1983, at 5;
Southland Enters Plea of lnnocent in Bribery Case, N.Y. L.J., May 12, 1983, at 1; Southland and 2 Charged in Bribe
Case, N.Y. L.J., May 6, 1983, at 1.
135. See In re John Doe Corp. (Southland Corp.), 675 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1982). The press correctly identified the
corporation as Southland Corporation a few weeks after issuance of the Second Circuit's opinion.
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"questionable practices to which [Southland] may have been a party since January 1,
1969. , 136
After a preliminary legal review of the matters raised by the SEC, [Southland's]
Board of Directors, acting on the recommendation of its Audit Committee, directed the
Legal Department to conduct a confidential company-wide legal study and investigation
of the Company's business practices. This investigation was the equivalent of the
questionable payments inquiries conducted by over 500 other corporations during this
time period. Its purpose was to provide a factual foundation which would enable the Legal
Department to render legal advice about [Southland's] exposure to liability in potential
litigation and about policies and internal controls to ensure compliance with applicable
laws and regulations. [Southland] intended the investigation to be confidential. All docu-
ments and information generated were to be subject to the attorney-client and work-
product privileges. 1
37
The internal investigation at Southland was conducted by Southland's in-house
Legal Department, with the assistance of the company's regular Washington, D.C.
outside counsel, Arnold & Porter. Southland's General Counsel, Clark J. Matthews
III, who directed the probe, was himself a former SEC enforcement lawyer and is a
highly reputable, extremely talented professional. John Fedders, one of the partners
at Arnold & Porter, rendered assistance in the internal review. Fedders, who thereaf-
ter became Stanley Sporkin's successor as SEC Enforcement Chief, is an ex-
ceptionally able, trustworthy, top-notch lawyer. No one who has ever practiced law
on either side of the table with John Fedders or Clark Matthews-and I have so
practiced with each of them at various times over the past 21 years-can doubt the
high sense of professional ethics of either. But hindsight, Monday morning quar-
terbacking in the press and in the courts in the last two years is picking apart their
internal Southland investigation and testing both their honor and their will.
Fedders was a veteran in the conduct of internal investigations during the SEC's
questionable payments era of the 1970s. He and his firm had conducted or advised
about the conduct of numerous Southland-type internal investigations.' 38 Indeed,
Fedders has published a chapter entitled Corporate Criminal Responsibility-
Conducting An Internal Investigation in a criminal law treatise 139 and has published a
detailed outline entitled Investigative Counsel's Vulnerability in a Continuing Legal
Education monograph. " Both works provide excellent legal and practical guidance
on structuring and conducting an internal corporate investigation. It appears that the
methodology subsequently espoused publicly by Fedders in his writings had been
used by Clark Matthews and his in-house legal staff-with Fedders' guidance and
direction-in the Southland investigation. An independent accounting firm was
specially retained to assist the inquiry. A detailed "privileged and confidential ques-
tionnaire" was distributed to 338 employees with management's direction that it was
136. Id. at 484 n.l.
137. Id.
138. Fedders Senate Statement, supra note 134. For example, Fedders was one of the counsel in In re Grand Jury
Subpoena Dated July 13, 1979 (Miller Brewing Co. and Phillip Morris, Inc.), 478 F. Supp. 368 (E.D. Wis. 1979).
139. Fedders, Corporate Criminal Responsibiity--Conducting An Internal Investigation, 3 CRIM. DEF. TECH-
NiQuts (MB) ch. 62 (1983).
140. Fedders, Investigative Counsel's Vulnerability, in PRAC'SING LAW INsTrruTE, supra note 2, at 295.
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Southland company policy to comply with all laws and regulations and that all
employees were instructed to cooperate in the internal inquiry.
After analyzing employee responses to the questionnaires, [Southland's] lawyers
interviewed selected employees. The lawyers advised these employees that the interviews
were part of the Business Ethics Review and were privileged and confidential....
[Southland's] lawyers compiled all the information they obtained in the investigation,
organized it, analyzed the legal implications, and offered legal advice in a report entitled
the Business Ethics Review. [Southland] regarded the report as privileged and con-
fidential and took steps to preserve its confidentiality. The Legal Department presented its
findings to the Board of Directors, which, among other actions, thereafter adopted a Code
of Business Conduct to guide future operations of the Company.
14 1
Twenty-five employees were interviewed before the questionnaire was devised and
disseminated. The questionnaire sought information respecting, among other things,
"any questionable payments to government officials, federal and state political con-
tributions, commercial bribes, kickbacks, discounts and rebates, and off-book or
inaccurately accounted for funds." 142 After the affirmative responses to the question-
naires were analyzed and summarized, eighty-eight additional interviews were held.
Outside counsel from Arnold & Porter, including Fedders, participated in only three
of the twenty-five initial interviews and in only one of the eighty-eight subsequent
interviews. This was consistent with Southland's desire to hold down the costs of the
internal investigation by having in-house counsel do as much of the investigative
work as possible. 143
Among a number of matters investigated was the payment of $96,500 to a
politically active Long Island lawyer (who served as a member of the New York City
Council), Eugene Mastropieri, in connection with a number of sales tax cases brought
by the New York State Tax Commission encompassing the correct sales tax liability
when a 7-Eleven franchise is terminated. Eugene DeFalco, a Southland division
manager, became concerned that the cases were not progressing rapidly enough and
at the recommendation of a Long Island businessman, caused Southland to retain
Mastropieri to assist Southland's regular Long Island counsel, Thomas Dougherty, in
the state tax cases. 144
Fedders described his awareness of the Mastropieri payment as follows:
Mastropieri then joined Dougherty as co-counsel in the sales tax cases. In July 1977,
Mastropieri submitted the only bill he ever presented for his services. It was for $96,500,
and DeFalco sent it to Dallas, where it was paid by check.
Events that preceded the payment to Mastropieri were unusual and, frankly, suspi-
cious. Prior to presentation of the legal bill, it had been suggested to Mr. Matthews that
the payment be billed as an airplane lease. Mr. Matthews rejected the suggestion out of
hand and insisted that Mastropieri would be paid only if he submitted a legal bill for
services, which he ultimately did. I learned later in 1977 that Mr. Matthews became
141. In re John Doe Corp., 675 F.2d 482, 484 n.l (2d Cir. 1982).
142. Fedders Senate Statement, supra note 134, at 11.
143. Id. at 9-12.
144. Id. at 13.
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suspicious enough to inquire personally in June 1977 of Mr. Dougherty whether Mastro-
pieri was providing professional assistance in this matter. Dougherty assured Matthews
that Mastropieri was actually providing professional services.145
The internal investigation turned up some indications that at least two employees
"harbored suspicions" that the Mastropieri fee "was inflated to include costs other
than legal fees." 146 DeFalco's supervisor, Frank Kitchen, either at a sales meeting
attended by several other Southland executives including its Board Chairman or from
subsequent discussions with DeFalco, surmised "that a payment was going to be
made to a state official for favorable treatment in a . . . tax liability case." 14 7 The
other attendees at the sales meeting denied any discussion of any improper use of the
fee. 148
At the conclusion of the internal investigation, Southland's Legal Department
prepared a seventy-one-page report for the Audit Committee. The report was edited
and revised by Fedders as outside counsel. It discussed, among other items, political
contributions, discounts paid, discounts received, and other activities, but never to
Fedders' recollection did any draft refer to the Mastropieri fee. 14 9 The Audit Com-
mittee considered the Legal Department report and had Fedders draft a six-page Audit
Committee report to the Board of Directors. The Audit Committee report dated
January 25, 1978, contained "A summary of the Legal Department's report, and
includes a brief background of the investigation, conclusions and specific recom-
mendations to Southland's Board made in light of the findings during the Business
Ethics Review.' 50 It did not, however, refer to the Mastropieri payment.
Mastropieri had been interviewed by telephone by Clark Matthews and "demon-
strated familiarity with the substance of the sales tax cases." 151 Mastropieri claimed
"his fee covered litigation costs through all appeals," and "indignantly rejected any
suggestion that the fee was to be used for any illegal purpose." 15 2
The Mastropieri fee and Clark Matthews' interview of Mastropieri were dis-
cussed orally with the Audit Committee. The Audit Committee itself questioned one
Southland executive about the payment to Mastropieri. Fedders described the January
12, 1978 Audit Committee meeting as follows:
At the conclusion of a lengthy discussion of the Mastropieri matter, it was the view
of all concerned that there was insubstantial evidence on which to base a conclusion of
illegality and that the Legal Department would, therefore, not include the subject in its
report. I believed at the time that this conclusion was reasonable. My partner, Bud Vieth,
subsequently concurred in this judgment.' 53
145. Id. at 13-14 (footnote omitted).
146. Id. at 15-16.
147. Id. at 16; see also In re Kitchen, 706 F.2d 1266 (2d Cir. 1983) (Kitchen's civil contempt conviction for not
answering grand jury questions reversed).
148. Fedders Senate Statement, supra note 134, at 16-17.
149. Id. at 18-20.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 21.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 21-22.
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In subsequent testimony to a Senate subcommittee, Fedders reviewed all the direct
and circumstantial evidence about the Mastropieri payment then known to him and
why it led him to believe that there was not sufficient evidence to support a conclu-
sion that a bribe or other illegality had occurred.
154
An additional factor considered by Fedders in deciding not to include a descrip-
tion of the Mastropieri payment in the written report was the risk of a defamation
action. This risk is a consideration that every audit committee and special counsel
must struggle with in determining how much to disclose publicly of the work product
gathered in an internal investigation not mandated by a court order.155
It is clear that the Mastropieri matter was discussed orally with Southland's full
Board of Directors, as well as with the Audit Committee, and that the Board con-
curred with the judgments of its counsel.156 Apart from this sensitive issue, inside
and outside counsel, the Audit Committee, and the Board made two further judgment
calls that arise in virtually every internal investigation: (1) what disclosure, if any,
need be made publicly or to the SEC respecting the corporate activities embraced by
and the results of the Business Ethics Review and (2) what documents, if any, should
be retained or destroyed after the internal investigation was completed.
Since the SEC had not been promised access to the results or work product of the
internal investigation, no informal disclosure was made to the SEC Enforcement
staff. 157 Applying the materiality test of the Northway case, 15 8 a determination was
made that the matters turned up in the internal inquiry were not material to South-
land's shareholders or potential investors. Thus, no disclosure was made in any
154. Id. at 23.
155. Fedders stated:
In addition to the insubstantiality of evidence of illegality, a factor in my mind-which I believe I
communicated to the Legal Department and to the Audit Committee-was that a conclusion that a bribe had
been paid or planned, if expressed in a report of this kind, could be the basis of a defamation action. Before
including in such a report any implication that a lawyer who had received a fee had intended to use it for a bribe
to the New York State Tax Commission, more substantial evidence of wrongdoing than we had in January 1978
was required.
Fedders Senate Statement, supra note 134, at 23.
The danger of a defamation action is a real one. The writer and his partners participated in negotiating an SEC
consent decree in one foreign payments case where the company was sued for libel and defamation by a person who fit the
general description of a person not identified in the public report of the investigation, but described as possibly having
been involved with questionable payments to foreign government officials. The writer and his partners are presently
involved in a similar defamation action against the OPM Bankruptcy Trustee brought by a former OPM employee-
salesman, and a leasing company he controlled, whose activities as they related to OPM were discussed in the OPM
Trustee's Report of Investigation. See In re O.P.M. Leasing Servs., Inc., Report of the Trustee Concerning Fraud and
Other Misconduct in the Management of the Affairs of the Debtor, Reorganization No. 81-B-10533 (BRL). (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. April 25, 1983); see also In re O.P.M. Leasing Servs., Inc., Debtor-George J. Prussin and Sha-Li Leasing
Assocs., Inc. v. James P. Hasset, Individually and as Trustee of O.P.M., Adversary Proceeding No. 83-5799A,
Reorganization No. 81-B-10533 (BRL) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983).
156. Fedders Senate Statement, supra note 134, at 23-26. Fedders pointed out:
Mr. Matthews described the Business Ethics Review, discussing the subjects covered by the Legal De-
partment's report. Mr. Matthews then reported orally to the Board on the Mastropieri matter. He explained that
while there were some suspicious circumstances, the Legal Department had been unable to determine that the
fee was used for any illegal purpose. As a result, it had not been included in the report. His oral statement was
accepted by the Board, which agreed with the disposition of the matter.
Id. at 26.
157. Fedders Senate Statement, supra note 134, at 24.
158. See TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, 426 U.S. 438, 450-51 (1976).
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formal SEC filing, no press releases were issued, and no type of public disclosure
was disseminated. 159
Fedders has particular expertise on retention or destruction of documents. He
has co-authored a law review article on the subject. 160 He advised Southland "to
retain corporate documents secured during the investigation, as well as completed
questionnaires and notes and memoranda of interviews."'161 However, he advised
Southland to discard all drafts of the report of investigation:
Absent a legal duty to retain, it has been my policy to discard drafts of my work. I
believed it to be a sound general policy which was applicable to this instance. A good
lawyer lets the final version of his work speak for itself. Drafts only create ambiguities
and raise doubts where none are intended. Consequently I advised the [Southland] Legal
Department that at Arnold & Porter we would discard all drafts, and I recommended
Southland do the same. I insisted, however, that corporate documents be retained and
suggested that documents relating to the Mastropieri matter be kept separately from those
which related to what was discussed in the report. 162
The issue of which documents should be retained and which ones discarded or
destroyed at the completion of an internal investigation is, indeed, a difficult one. No
specific hornbook rules apply. Fedders himself, in the conclusion to his Notre Dame
Lawyer article, articulates the concerns very well:
Companies which adopt records management programs [i.e., document retention-
destruction programs] ... confront difficult legal and ethical questions regarding, first,
continuing ad hoc search and destroy operations, and second, the timing of suspensions of
routine document destruction programs in the face of "reasonably" or "clearly" foresee-
able or pending investigations or proceedings. Beyond doubt, federal criminal statutes and
the Code of Professional Responsibility are violated if management and counsel agree to
destroy relevant documents after process requiring their production has been served.
Furthermore, great risk of violation arises if management and counsel agree to destroy
relevant documents in the course of voluntary cooperation with government authorities, or
upon learning indirectly of relevant government inquiry. Many other actions by manage-
ment and counsel, both intentional and inadvertent, give rise to the possibility of criminal
and ethical sanctions.
For these reasons, what once was a simple business decision to destroy obsolete or
seemingly inconsequential documents has become a senior management concern deserv-
ing serious and thoughtful attention. Lawyers must be prepared to assist business clients in
responding to the continually enlarging sphere of difficulties surrounding the destruction
of documents. The possible legal, practical and ethical consequences of document de-
struction are vast .... 163
The Southland case demonstrates that when the destruction of drafts of an
159. Articulating the Northway "materiality" standard, Fedders commented "My judgment then was-as it is
today--that there was no substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the information in the report would be viewed by
reasonable shareholders or investors as having significantly altered the total mix of information then made available by
Southland." Fedders Senate Statement, supra note 134, at 24.
160. Fedders & Guttenplan, Document Retention and Destruction: Practical, Legal and Ethical Considerations, 56
NoTRE DAME LAw. 5 (1980); see also Borow & Baskin, The Internal Corporate Investigation: Destruction of Documents
and Routine Record Retention Prograns, in PRACnINo LAW INSTrum, supra note 2, at 209.
161. Fedders Senate Statement, supra note 134, at 24-25.
162. Id. at 25.
163. Fedders & Guttenplan, supra note 160, at 64.
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internal investigative report is coupled with selective disclosure of the final report to
third parties who are in a position to provide advantage to the Company, disaster can
follow. 164
Unbeknownst to Fedders, after the Southland internal investigation, the com-
pany provided access to the confidential report of investigation to its underwriter's
counsel and its outside auditors in connection with the public offering of seventy-five
million dollars of Southland securities.'
65
The district court held that Southland's investigative report and materials were
not privileged. Southland was held in contempt when it refused to produce the
documents before a federal grand jury. 166 The Second Circuit affirmed the contempt
order.167 The circuit court observed that at an in camera hearing the government
presented evidence "to support its claim that [Southland's] BER [Business Ethics
Review] dated January 23, 1978, was in furtherance of a course of ongoing criminal-
ity," and that "a compelling need had been shown for the subpoenaed materials
under the work-product doctrine."
168
Addressing the selective disclosure of the BER report to the outside auditors, the
court pointed out testimony
that disclosure was in connection with the 1977 audit and was necessary to verify repre-
sentations by [Southland's] management that no specific disclosures pertaining to matters
in the BER were required in the 1977 financial statements. Had the accounting firm not
been shown the BER, it would have issued only a qualified opinion on the 1977 state-
ments. That would have been "disastrous" for [Southland] since the Securities and
Exchange Commission ... would not accept a qualified opinion were [Southland] to
attempt to raise capital by a public offering of registered securities.
169
The court went on to point out that in performance of "due diligence," counsel to the
underwriter had inspected Southland's corporate minutes and had discovered that a
business ethics review had been performed.17 o Counsel insisted on having access to
the BER to assure that the Southland prospectus and registration statement to be filed
with the SEC were not false and misleading. Absent disclosure of the BER, there was
a chance that the underwriter would refuse to go forward with the public offering.
The court also pointed out that the outside auditors specifically questioned South-
land's general counsel, Clark Matthews, "with specific questions about the $96,500
paid to [Mastropieri]." 17'
164. See In re John Doe Corp., 675 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1982).
165. See Fedders Senate Statement, supra note 134, at 27:
I did not... participate in any way in Southland's December 1978 underwritten public offering of
$75,000,000 in sinking fund debentures. Arnold & Porter has not, to my knowledge, ever represented South-
land in any underwritten public securities offering, and it did not represent Southland in this one. Neither I nor
any other Arnold & Porter attorney participated in any way, therefore, in a decision about whether to disclose to
Touche Ross & Co., Southland's independent public accountants, or to White & Case, the underwriters'
counsel in the December 1978 offering, either (1) the Business Ethics Review report, or (2) the Mastropieri
matter. I learned for the f'rst time after April 1980, that the Business Ethics Review had been shown to Touche
Ross & Co. and to White & Case in 1978.
166. See In re John Doe Corp., 675 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1982).
167. Id. at 483.






Employees of the accounting firm conducting the continuous audit of [Southland] had
been unable to substantiate the performance of any services by [Mastropieri]. Accountant
brought this to General Counsel's attention, and inquired whether any portion of the fee
had been used as a bribe .... No testimony was elicited at this time as to General
Counsel's reply because of assertions of attorney-client privilege. 1
72
Four of the five Southland employees who were subpoenaed to testify before the
grand jury about the BER report, its drafts, and whether the Mastropieri matter had
been disclosed in any drafts, declined to testify on Fifth Amendment grounds. 173
However, the government produced a copy of a memorandum made by the auditor
respecting his conversation with Southland's General Counsel (who declined to give
grand jury testimony on Fifth Amendment grounds). The memorandum indicated that
the Mastropieri matter had been disclosed in early drafts of the BER report, but was
deleted after Clark Matthews' telephone interview of Mastropieri in which Mastro-
pieri denied the bribe scheme and maintained he had rendered appropriate legal
services. 17
4
The Second Circuit concluded that Southland had waived its attorney-client
privilege for two reasons: First, disclosure to the auditors in connection with the
conduct of the audit constituted a waiver since it "evidences a corporate decision to
use the materials for purposes other than seeking legal advice." Second, disclosure to
counsel for the underwriter waived the privilege "so far as the payment to [Mastro-
pieri] is concerned.' 175
This is a more difficult conclusion to reach since the final BER made no mention of that
payment. But General Counsel's statement to Accountant that mention had been made in
earlier drafts and deleted after his investigation supports, we believe, the conclusion that
silence was intended by [Southland] as an affirmance to all who read the BER of the
propriety of the payment. Underwriter Counsel testified that bribes to public officials
would have led him to ask [Southland] to include disclosure in its registration statement.
Designation of the BER as a report on questionable practices and deletion of the discus-
sion relating to [Mastropieri] in the final draft leads us to conclude that silence in this case
was not a neutral statement. 1
76
In articulating this rule, the Second Circuit relied on the Permian Corp. decision,' 77
where the D.C. Circuit Court rejected a "pick and choose" theory of attorney-client
privilege.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 486.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 488, relying upon In re Horowitz, 482 F.2d 72, 81 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 867 (1973)
(statements to accountants unrelated to the seeking of legal advice are not privileged).
176. In re John Doe Corp., 675 F.2d 482, 489 (2d Cir. 1982).
177. Id.; see Permian Corp. v. United States, 665 F.2d 1214, 1221 (D.C. Cir. 1981). The court rejected Southland's
argument that disclosure to underwriter's counsel was not voluntary because it was "coerced by the legal duty of due
diligence and the millions of dollars riding on the public offering of registered securities." Id. The court explained:
A claim that a need for confidentiality must be respected in order to facilitate the seeking and rendering of
informed legal advice is not consistent with selective disclosure when the claimant decides that the confidential
materials can be put to other beneficial purposes. Federal securities laws put a price of disclosure upon access to
interstate capital markets. Once materials are utilized in that disclosure, they become representations to third
parties by the corporation. The fact that they were originally compiled by attorneys is irrelevant because they are
serving a purpose other than the seeking and rendering of legal advice.
Id. at 489 (emphasis added.)
1984]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
The court in the Southland case also concluded that even had the attorney-client
privilege not been waived, its assertion in that matter was inappropriate because a
prima facie showing had been made that the BER and the assertion of privilege were
part of a scheme of "ongoing criminality." 1 7 8 After reviewing an in camera submis-
sion made by the government, the court concluded "without difficulty" that there
was "probable cause" to believe
1) the payment to [Mastropieri] was part of a criminal scheme to bribe public official(s);
2) a diligent investigation of that payment would not have provided a basis for deleting
discussion of the payment to Lawyer from the final BER or for the reassurances given by
General Counsel to Accountant ... ; 3) the final BER was used to conceal the criminal
scheme from the underwriter for the public offering and the accounting firm certifying the
1977 financial statements; and 4) after the BER investigation, actions were taken in the
name of the corporation to cover up the criminal schemes. 17
9
Thus, the court applied the classic crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client
privilege. lSO At this juncture of the In re John Doe Corp. opinion, the court proffered
some gratuitous advice that, I suggest, should be a cause for rumination by counsel
and corporate client alike in structuring the methodology of an internal corporate
investigation:
We recognize that corporate counsel coming upon evidence of criminality in com-
munications protected under Upjohn are placed in an uncomfortable position. Their supe-
riors or clients may well fear the commercial or even more serious personal consequences
of disclosure. The lawyers' professional relationship to the corporation may extend well
beyond aspects relating to criminal liability and leave them torn between a desire to see
the firm prosper and their professional and legal obligations. In such cases, the wiser
course may be to hire counsel with no other connection to the corporation to conduct
investigations such as the BER. 181
In my view, In re John Doe Corp. (Southland) is one of the two or three most
important cases so far decided concerning what Al Sommer described as the "extra-
legal" institution of internal corporate investigations.1
8 2
The John Doe opinion handed down by the Second Circuit on March 23, 1982,
did not end the Southland saga. Indeed, it had barely just begun. Throughout the
summer and fall of 1982, the grand jury continued its investigation. 18 3 In May 1983,
the grand jury indicted Eugene Mastropieri, Southland Corporation, and Eugene
DeFalco, a Southland division manager, for various charges of mail fraud, wire
178. In re John Doe Corp., 675 F.2d 482, 488 (2d Cir. 1982).
179. Id. at 491.
180. Id., citing In re Doe, 551 F.2d 899 (2d Cir. 1977); see also United States v. Rosenstein, 474 F.2d 705 (2d Cir.
1973).
181. In re John Doe Corp., 675 F.2d 482, 491 (2d Cir. 1982) (citing Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383
(1981)). The court emphasized that "Ic]orporate counsel need not run to the FBI upon the first sign of criminality in an
Upjohn protected communication" but cautioned that such communications are privileged only for the purpose of seeking
and receiving legal advice. The investigation may not be used "to allay the concerns of third parties about possible
criminal acts," to cover up a crime, or "to create the appearance of compliance with laws requiring disclosure." To do so
vitiates the otherwise applicable privilege. In re John Doe Corp. (Southland), 675 F.2d 482, 491-92 (2d Cir. 1982).
182. The Southland court affirmed the district court's findings that the government "had made a sufficient showing
of need to overcome the work-product doctrine." In re John Doe Corp. (Southland), 675 F.2d 482, 492 (2d Cir. 1982).
183. See Jury Studies Southland Payment, N.Y. Times, Aug. 3, 1982, at D-9, col. 3.
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fraud, and conspiracy to commit bribery of an unknown member of the New York
State Tax Commission.
1 84
The indictments charged that the supposed $96,500 legal fee for Mastropieri was
laundered through the Bank of Montreal in Toronto, Canada to establish a $20,000
slush fund to finance the intended bribe. Mastropieri also allegedly paid a kickback
for an undetermined amount to DeFalco without the knowledge of Southland's
shareholders. The indictments charged that the labelling of the payment to Mastro-
pieri as a "legal fee" was in fact a false entry in Southland's books and records.' 85
As part of the concealment of the conspiracy, the Mastropieri indictment also alleged
that the Southland Business Ethics Review failed to disclose the continuing con-
spiracy to the company's audit committee, independent accountant auditors, outside
tax counsel and the Securities and Exchange Commission.'
86
The Southland-DeFalco indictment alleged that Southland through its agents
directed Frank Kitchen (a Southland officer) to disobey an order of a United States
District Judge that he testify before the grand jury. 187 Kitchen was held in contempt,
but the Second Circuit reversed his contempt conviction on procedural due process
grounds.' 88 Southland and DeFalco originally pled innocent,' 89 but in September
1983, DeFalco changed his plea to guilty.' 90 Meanwhile, John Fedders and his
former firm, Arnold & Porter, suffered a merciless barrage of criticism and innuendo
in the press-much of it unfair in my view-for the role they played in the internal
investigation. 191
One of the issues raised was whether it was appropriate for Arnold & Porter to
continue to defend Southland in the criminal case when present and former partners
of Arnold & Porter might be forced to testify at the eventual criminal trial respecting
what knowledge they each did or did not have about particular aspects of the internal
184. See Southland And 2 Charged in Bribe Case, N.Y. L.J., May 6, 1983, at 1.
185. See id. Similar charges are contained in the Southland-DeFalco indictment.
186. Id. Mastropieri had been a member of the City Council of the City of New York until July 1980 and had been
Chairman of the Committee on Economic and Industrial Development of the City Council. The indictments charged that
Mastropieri did not perform, or even intend to perform, any substantial legal services and was retained to use his influence
as a member of the City Council and to act as an intermediary in the payment of a bribe to a public official or officials of
the Tax Commission. Newspaper reports of the indictments indicated that Mastropieri had resigned from the City Council
in June 1980 "following his Federal indictment for aiding law clients to conceal nearly $500,000 in income and evade
more than $250,000 in Federal income taxes," and that he was convicted and sentenced to jail in October 1980, and
suspended from law practice in New York State in 1981. See Bribe Charges. N.Y. L.J., May 6, 1983, at 6.
187. Id.
188. See In re Kitchen, 706 F.2d 1266 (2d Cir. 1983); see also Vilkin, Southland Exec Wins Appeal-2d Circuit
Reverses Contempt Citation, Nat'l L.J., May 9, 1983, at 9.
189. See Southland Enters Plea of Innocent in Bribery Case, N.Y. L.J., May 12, 1983, at I.
190. See Vilkin, Southland Trial Postponed; Executive Enters Guilty Plea, Nat'l L.J., Sept. 26, 1983, at 3; Carley,
New Grand Jury Probes Southland Corp. For Alleged Scheme To Bribe Tax Official, Wall St. J., Sept. 14, 1983, at 4,
col. 2; Freid, Southland Official in Bribe Plea-Company Still Faces Charges, N.Y. Times, Sept. 14, 1983, at D-5, col.
1; Southland Executive Files Guilty Plea on Eve of Trial, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 14, 1983, at 1.
191. See, e.g., Vilkin, Key Questions Likely to be Raised on Fedders" Role in Southland Probe, Nat'l L.J., June 13,
1983, at 3; Hudson, SEC's Fedders has Legal Bills Paid by Law Firm-Costs in Southland Corp. Case Met by Arnold &
Porter, His Previous Employer, Wall St. J., June 3, 1983, at 6, col. 3; Southland Probe Eyes SEC Chief of Enforcement,
N.Y. Times, June 1, 1983, at A-I; Thornton, supra note 134; Vilkin, Southland Case Raises Ethics Issue-Will Lawyers
Testify? Nat'l L.J., May 23, 1983, at 5.
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investigation. 192 Another complicated issue for several months was Fedders' desire to
testify before Congress about his role in the investigation and Southland's refusal to
waive attorney-client privilege to allow him to testify. 193
In his Senate testimony, in response to tough questioning by Senator D'Amato,
Fedders stated that his role in the Southland investigation was "limited," even
though he felt it was generally better to let independent counsel conduct such in-
vestigations. He explained his limited role as a product of Southland's desire to keep
the costs of the investigation down through principal reliance on in-house counsel. 1
94
Fedders also pointed out another pitfall of internal investigations-the lack of sub-
poena power-and rationalized that had Southland had the government's in-
vestigative powers, its internal investigation might have uncovered the bribery
scheme. 195
Amid all the publicity in the Southland case, 196 it appears that the SEC itself has
belatedly commenced a private investigation of the matter and that Fedders has given
sworn testimony in that inquiry.' 97 And the grand jury is still continuing to in-
vestigate. Indeed, another Southland executive was indicted in November 1983.198 I
suspect when all the criminal litigation in Southland is over, the cases will provide
192. See Vilkin, Southland Case Raises Ethics Issue-Will Lawyers Testify? Nat'Il L.J., May 23, 1983, at 5; see also
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-102 (1980); Vilkin, Southland Trial Postponed; Executive Enters
Guilty Plea, Nat'l L.J., Sept. 26, 1983, at 3; Vilkin, Fee Wasfor Influence, Southland Aide Told FBI, Nat'l L.J., July 18,
1983, at 4.
193. See Thornton, supra note 134. Representative Dingell had reportedly stated: "'The Southland matter raises
issues of character and integrity which may reflect on his fitness to hold his present office. Mr. Fedders has been taking
positions on legal and policy matters, some of which may involve issues in the Southland case where he has a strong
personal interest at stake." Id. Dingell's House Energy and Commerce Subcommittee was seeking to explore Fedders'
role in private practice in the Southland matter and to explore in light of Fedders having become SEC Enforcement Chief
why the SEC had taken no action in the case. In light of Representative Dingell's comments to the press, it is understand-
able that when Fedders was informed that he was a "subject" but not a "target" of a continuing grand jury inquiry and
therefore was free to testify to attempt to clear his name (even though Southland had not waived its asserted privilege),
Fedders testified before a Senate subcommittee chaired by Senator D'Amato rather than appearing before Representative
Dingell. See Fedders' Senate Statement (June 28, 1983); Fedders Invites Hearing On His Role In Alleged Bribery
Conspiracy Matter, 15 SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 1019 (June 3, 1983); Fedders Denies Wrongdoing in Southland Case,
83-125 SEC TODAY 1 (1983) (reporting Fedders' testimony before Subcommittee on Securities of Senate Committee on
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs); Fedders Denies Prior Knowledge ofAlleged Southland Conspiracy. 15 SEc. REG.
& L. REP. (BNA) 1259 (1983); Vilkin, Fedders Describes Role in Southland Investigation, Nat'l L.J., July 11, 1983,
at 3.
194. Fedders stressed that "[flor a company to be cost conscious is not improper." 83-125 SEC TODAY 2 (1983).
195. See Fedders Denies Prior Knowledge of Alleged Southland Conspiracy, 15 SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA)
1259-60 (1983): "Contending that any private investigation has limitations, Fedders argued that if Southland had the
government's power to subpoena witnesses and to compel truthful testimony, 'further investigation might have uncovered
additional relevant facts.' "
196. See, e.g., The Complex Case of the U.S. v. Southland-To What Extent Are Companies Liable for Their
Employees' Crimes, Business Week, Nov. 21, 1983, at 108.
197. See, e.g., Vilkin, Fedders Doesn't Recall Key Events on Southland, Nat'l L.J., Aug. 29, 1983, at 5.
198. See, e.g., Southland Executive Indicted; Grand Jury Probe Continuing, Nat'l L.J., Nov. 28, 1983, at 5
(indictment of Southland Senior Vice President S. Richmond Dole); A Second Top Official At Southland Indicted In
Bribery Conspiracy, Wall St. J., Nov. 21, 1983 at 47, col. 3.
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further guidance for avoiding pitfalls in the conduct of internal corporate in-
vestigations.1 9
9
The tough disclosure issue faced by inside and outside counsel in the Southland
case remind me that John Fedders-after he donned his SEC Enforcement helmet-
did join with SEC Commissioner Bevis Longstreth in attempting to provide corporate
America and the Bar with some guidance regarding when the SEC would take the
position in a formal enforcement action that the federal securities laws require dis-
closure based upon an "integrity of management" or related "integrity of sales or
earnings," "integrity of books and records," or "integrity of assets" rationale. 200 In
his November 1982 ABA speech, Fedders offered five propositions for guidance as to
SEC enforcement policy in the "management integrity" disclosure area. Let me
quote a portion of his summary:
First, the Commission should begin enforcement actions where failure to disclose
unlawful conduct violates traditional quantitative standards of materiality .... How-
ever, conduct that violates federal, state or foreign law, may be, but is not necessarily
material ....
Second, the Commission should initiate enforcement actions where there is a failure
to disclose self-dealing or conflict of interest transactions ....
Third, the Commission should commence enforcement actions where there is a
failure to disclose information mandated by the disclosure requirements of the Com-
mission's rules for proxy materials, periodic reports or registration statements-
199. There has been a great deal of activity in the Southland case since the submission of this article. The criminal
trial was held in May 1984. John Fedders was called as a witness. Southland Corporation and Mastropieri were convicted
by the jury, but the jury hung and a mistrial was declared regarding Southland officer S. Richmond Dole. Thereafter, in
August 1984, the grand jury returned a new indictment against Mr. Dole and added an additional defendant-Southland's
general counsel, Clark J. Matthews Il. Messrs. Dole and Matthews are presently awaiting trial on the new indictment.
Another Southland Official Charged, One Is Reindicted, Nat'l L.J., Aug. 13, 1984, at 1; Kohn, Third Official Implicated:
Retrial For Bribe Conspiracy Set For Southland Executive, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 3, 1984, at 1; Freid, Southland Official Is
Charged-Company Gets $10,000 Fine, N.Y. Times, Aug. 3, 1984, at 33; Southland Corp. Fined; Kohn, Third Official
Indicted In Probe Of Bribe Plan, Wall St. J., Aug. 3, 1984, at 1; Riley, The End Of The Line In Southland Probe? Nat'l
L.J., June 25, 1984, at 1; Capeci, Was There A Company Conspiracy? Nat'l L.J., May 28, 1984, at 13.
200. See SEC Commissioner Longstreth, Remarks to Investors Responsibility Research Center in New York City
(Oct. 18, 1982). An expanded version of these remarks was recently published as Longstreth, SEC Disclosure Policy
Regarding Management Integrity, 38 Bus. LAW. 1413 (1983); see also KARMEL, REGULATION BY PROSECIriON ch. 7
(1982); A. MATHEWS, MANAGEMENT INTEGRrrY THEORIES OF MATERIALITY AND SEC DISCLOsURE REQUIREMENTS in
Materials. Univ. of Cal. 10th Annual Securities Regulation Institute (1983); Branch & Rubright, Integrity of Management
Disclosures Under the Federal Securities Laws, 37 Bus. LAW. 1447 (1982); Ferrara, Starr, & Steinberg, supra note 133;
Karmel Cites Trend Away From Economic Materiality As Disclosure Problem For Both SEC and Business, 526 SEc.
REG. & L. REP. (BNA) A-8 (1979); Roiter, Illegal Corporate Practices and the Disclosure Requirements of the Federal
Securities Laws, 50 FORDHAM L. REv. 781 (1982); Comment, Disclosure of Regulatory Violations Under the Federal
Securities Laws: Establishing the Limits of Materiality, 30 AM. U.L. REv. 225 (1981); Speech by John M. Fedders on
Failure to Disclose Illegal Conduct, 14 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 2057 (Nov. 26, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Fedders
Speechl; R. Karmel (then SEC Commissioner), Qualitative and Differential Disclosure, speech at Financial Executives
Institute International Conference, Atlanta, Georgia (Oct. 17, 1979). Compare Decker v. Massey-Ferguson, Ltd., 681
F.2d 111 (2d Cir. 1982); SEC v. Washington County Util. Dist., 676 F.2d 218 (6th Cir. 1982) (integrity of books violated
by showing a paper profit); United States v. Stirling, 571 F.2d 708 (2d Cir. 1978) (integrity of sales and purchases of
stock); SEC v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 452 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Wis. 1978) (disclosure of hiring practices based on
integrity of management); and SEC v. Kalvex, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 310 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (integrity of management
requires disclosure); with Abbey v. Control Data Corp., 603 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1979) (illegal foreign payments should not
be dealt with under disclosure provisions); and SEC v. Chicago Helicopters Indus. Inc., No. 79-C-0469 (N.D. II1. Jan.
18, 1980); Amalgamated Clothing v. J.P. Stephens & Co., 475 F. Supp. 328 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), vacated as moot, 638
F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 1980) (per curiam) (integrity of management not implicated in failure to disclose plan to do illegal acts).
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particularly facts about director or senior officer conduct. By its enforcement efforts, the
Commission must preserve the integrity of the line item disclosure requirements.
Fourth, the Commission should begin enforcement actions when untrue statements of
material facts are made or statements made are misleading by the omission of material
facts. Issuers must be held accountable for materially misleading statements in disclosure
documents.
Fifth, absent the foregoing circumstances, the Commission generally should not
utilize the antifraud provisions of the securities laws for law enforcement where there is a
failure to disclose conduct which may be considered qualitatively material .... [T]here
are no benchmarks of general application in the area of qualitative materiality. The
Commission has not promulgated line item disclosure requirements relating to all illegal
conduct, or, to the extent necessary, articulated a policy for law enforcement where
information about such conduct has not been disclosed. Therefore, corporations do not
have the procedural benefit of a rule specifying what type of unethical, antisocial or illegal
conduct may be deemed to be material by the Commission. Significant uncertainties and
potential liabilities exist.2" t
Unfortunately, statements of enforcement policy are not law. Courts may be in-
fluenced by Fedders' speech to apply a narrow view of materiality via the integrity
theories. But they may also disregard his pronouncements.
B. In re Sealed Case (Tesoro Petroleum)20 2 and In re Subpoenas Duces Tecum
(Fulbright & Jaworski and Vinson & Elkins)20 3
In April 1982, the District of Columbia Circuit issued an opinion in a foreign
payment case styled In re Sealed Case.20 4 The decision, like the Southland decision,
is of importance in the development of the law surrounding internal corporate in-
vestigations. While the John Doe (Southland) opinion of the Second Circuit dealt
primarily with attorney-client privilege aspects of internal investigations, the Sealed
Case (Tesoro Petroleum) opinion of the D.C. Circuit wrestles principally with the
attorney work-product doctrine respecting an internal investigation.
A federal grand jury in the District of Columbia was investigating Tesoro's
foreign payments. When the grand jury subpoenaed the files of Tesoro's in-house
general counsel relating to the company's internal payments investigation, the com-
pany and its agent (an in-house lawyer) refused to produce the files, claiming work-
product protection. The company's agent was held in contempt. On appeal, the D.C.
Circuit held that six of the eight subpoenaed files might be subject to valid work-
201. Fedders Speech, supra note 200, at 1-2 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). For an article dealing with the
related area of the SEC's development and refinement of disclosure standards generally through ad hoc administrative
disciplinary proceedings, rather than by rulemaking, see Rowe, Disclosure Standards in SEC Proceedings. 16 REv. SEC.
REG. 965 (1983).
202. In re Sealed Case (Tesoro Petroleum), 676 F.2d 793 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
203. In re Subpoenas Duces Tecum (Fulbright & Jaworski and Vinson & Elkins), [1983-1984 Transfer Binder]
FED. SeC. L. REP. (CCH) 99,505 (D.D.C. Sept. 23, 1983), affd, FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 91,566 (D.C. Cir. Sept.
23, 1984).
204. In re Sealed Case (Tesoro Petroleum), 676 F.2d 793 (D.C. Cir. 1982). A few weeks after publication of this
opinion, the press correctly identified the subject corporation as Tesoro Petroleum Company.
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product protection, but two of the files clearly were not so protected. 0 5 The court's
conclusion was premised on the two separate principles of waiver of and exception to
the work-product privilege.20 6
The government had an affidavit from a witness dubbed "X" and described as
"an American citizen with business interests in a specific foreign country. '"207 Wit-
ness "X" described a payoff in connection with a foreign contract:
Shortly after the signing of the contract in [the country where X does business]
during the first part of Oct. 1974 I received a phone call from [a senior officer at
Company]. He said they were having difficulty in arranging the pay off to [the senior
official of a company owned by the foreign government] and asked me if I could get them
an invoice to cover it from a company I was associated with [in the foreign country]. He
said that once the ... pay off was taken care of they would then arrange for the financing
I needed for my [business].
I arranged for [the Company officer] to get the invoice he needed on the stationery of
[the company I owned].
The date for the pay off was set .... [The foreign official and a woman] arrived at
my house about 9:30 AM. I left shortly after to pick up [Company's chairman] at the
airport. I picked up [Company's chairman] at about 10:30 AM and as we were driving to
my House he said that we had to stop first at the [Bank] & pick up the money. He said that
he had a check made out to [my company] and that all I had to do was endorse it because
the arrangements had already been made with the Bank. I reluctantly agreed, with con-
siderable misgivings about entering the transaction.
We arrived at the Bank where everything was ready, the money was counted out, and
we left. [An associate of the chairman] was waiting in his car in front of the Bank and
followed us to my House where he remained in his car. [The chairman] and I entered the
House where [the woman and the official] were waiting. I placed the Briefcase containing
the money on the floor. After the greetings and Handshakes [the chairman] picked up the
Briefcase and opened it and said, "Here's your 200 thousand. We counted it at the Bank
but we can count it again if you want." [The Chairman] then proceeded to count the
money. [The official] said no, it's not necessary. [The chairman] then closed the Briefcase
and handed it to [the official].20 8
The court described "three successive investigations of the company's business
practices and candor," i.e., separate investigations by the IRS, the SEC, and the
grand jury.20 9 Indeed, there were really four investigations because the SEC in-
vestigation embraced both the formal SEC governmental investigation and Tesoro's
defensive internal corporate self-investigation pursuant to the SEC's voluntary dis-
closure program.210
Tesoro had been subjected to an IRS corporate slush funds investigation, 2 1 and
205. In re Sealed Case (Tesoro Petroleum), 676 F.2d 793, 816 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
206. Id. at 798.
207. Id.
208. Id. (footnote omitted).
209. Id. at 799-805.
210. Id. at 801-02.
211. For a description of the IRS illegal domestic and foreign payments program, see Dunn, Questionable Pay-
ments: A Consideration of Certain Specific Issues and A Current Overall Evaluation, 36TH ANNUAL N.Y.U. INSMrUrE
ON FEDERAL TAXATION 1309 (1978). See also Chu & Magraw, The Deductibility of Questionable Foreign Payments, 87
YALE L.J. 1091 (1978).
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the company and its executives had been subjected to "a list of 19 questions" to be
answered in affidavit form.2 12 For some reason unknown to me, the IRS had ex-
panded its well-known "eleven questions" (more recently "five questions") to nine-
teen for Tesoro.213 Tesoro executives, including the company's chairman, in answer-
ing the IRS questions admitted making payments to finders, consultants, and sales
agents with respect to foreign business, but denied knowledge of bribes. Tesoro's
chairman specifically averred: "To the best of my knowledge, the payments
... were not bribes, kickbacks or other such payments to obtain favorable treatment
in securing business or otherwise to obtain special concessions, or to pay, for favor-
able treatment for business secured or for special concessions already obtained.' 214
Responses from at least one Tesoro vice president also indicated that he may have
received an improper reimbursement from the company for a domestic political
campaign contribution.215
The SEC began a private investigation in the midst of the IRS investigation. In
the initial, informal portion of the SEC investigation, Tesoro was allowed to conduct
its own internal investigation as part of the SEC's voluntary disclosure program. 21
6
The voluntary disclosure program was well developed by early 1977, when the staff
of the SEC contacted Company and suggested that it make use of the voluntary method to
clear the air about any payments of questionable legality in the United States or abroad.
Accordingly, Company's board of directors retained a large law firm to act as special
investigative counsel and set up a special committee of independent directors to oversee
the investigation. During the summer of 1977 lawyers from the firm examined hundreds
of documents in Company's files and interviewed 52 persons, all officers, directors,
employees, or consultants hired by the Company. 217
In May 1978, special counsel submitted its payments report to Tesoro's Special
Committee. While generic in content-with names of foreign nations described by
code-"the report disclosed in detail questionable business practices in six
countries. - 8 The report described a potpourri of suspicious details involving the
company's and its chairman's dealings with the payment of $200,000 to "X" as well
as a $200,000 loan guarantee to one of "X's" companies. However, investigative
counsel's report contained the following disclaimer:
No directors, officers or employees of the Company interviewed by us expressed any
knowledge that either the $200,000 payments to ["X"] or the proceeds of the loan
guaranteed by [Company] were used in any way to benefit personally any public officials
of the foreign country .... Nevertheless, we believe that the manner and circumstances
of payment and the participation therein of the Chairman of the Board ... raise questions
of irregularity which we have not been able to resolve satisfactorily, particularly in light of
our inability to interview ["X"]. 2 19
212. In re Sealed Case (Tesoro Petroleum), 676 F.2d 793, 799 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
213. See United States v. Wyatt, 637 F.2d 293 (5th Cir. 1981) (court sustains IRS "eleven questions"); United
States v. Richards, 479 F. Supp. 828 (E.D. Va. 1979), affd, 631 F.2d 341 (4th Cir. 1980) (court upholds narrowing of
IRS "eleven questions"); United States v. Richards, 431 F. Supp. 249 (E.D. Va. 1977).
214. In re Sealed Case (Tesoro Petroleum), 676 F.2d 793, 799 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (footnote omitted).
215. Id. at 799-800.
216. See supra note 70 for a discussion of the SEC's Voluntary Disclosure Program.
217. In re Sealed Case (Tesoro Petroleum), 676 F.2d 793, 801 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
218. Id. at 801-02.
219. ld. at 802 (footnote omitted).
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The report did not explain why "X" could not be interviewed, nor what "X"
supposedly did to earn a fee of $400,000.
The investigative counsel's report also described various company dis-
bursements "that would appear to have violated the provisions of applicable federal
election laws. "220 Tesoro gave the SEC a copy of the payments report and access to
much of the underlying investigative work product. Through such access the SEC
staff found evidence of possible bribery in a seventh country, not covered in the
report.22' On the basis of the report and its underlying investigative work product, the
SEC filed an injunctive action against Tesoro. Tesoro consented to the injunction.
Since the company had already conducted the internal investigation, the ancillary
relief in the consent decree was quite mild-principally the appointment of one new
independent director, satisfactory to the SEC, who would serve as chair of the
company's audit committee. 222 But the SEC injunction was not the only consequence
of Tesoro's volunteerism. The SEC referred the Tesoro case to the Department of
Justice for consideration of possible criminal prosecution.2 23 The grand jury in-
vestigation followed.
The company provided the grand jury with copies of the same documents it had
provided to the SEC,224 including the investigative report. Tesoro's former general
counsel turned over thirty-eight documents subpoenaed by the grand jury to the
company's outside counsel defending the grand jury investigation. The grand jury
then issued a subpoena to outside counsel for the documents. Both the company and
outside counsel asserted attorney-client and work-product privilege. The district court
rejected the government's argument that the facts established the "crime-fraud"
exception to attorney-client and work-product privileges. 225 However, the district
court ruled that the company had waived both attorney-client privilege and work-
product protection as to portions of eight of the documents. 226
Tesoro changed defense counsel in the grand jury investigation, the thirty-eight
documents passed to the new outside law firm, and, "in due course, a new grand jury
issued a subpoena for the documents addressed to their current possessor.' '227 The
220. Id.
221. Id. at 803.
222. SECv. Tesoro Petroleum corp., SEC Lit. Release No. 9236, [1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. Rt'. (CCH)
T 97,699 (D.D.C. Nov. 20, 1980).
223. In re Sealed Case (Tesoro Petroleum), 676 F.2d 793, 803 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
224. Id.
225. Id. at 813-14.
226. The district court found waiver based on two lines of reasoning:
First, the court held that Company's prior disclosures revealed the substance of attorney-client confidences
about certain questionable payments discussed in the investigative counsel's report and interview notes. There-
fore, Company had waived its attorney-client privilege with respect to the payments, and the court concluded
that the purposes of the work product privilege were so closely related that waiver of the attorney-client privilege
should also constitute waiver of the work product privilege .... Second, the District Court found that the report
and notes did not contain the same wealth of relevant detail as the documents under subpoena in this case. The
court characterized the version of the facts that appeared in the report as an "enchanted ... tale," and it went
on to state, "This kind of selective waiver is precisely the kind of manipulation and sl[e]ight-of-hand that led to
the waiver doctrine in the first place." The District Court also rejected the government's argument that all of the
documents under subpoena came within the "crime-fraud" exception to both privileges.
Id. at 804 n.33 (citations omitted). The Court of Appeals rejected an appeal of the district court's denial of Tesoro's
motion to quash the grand jury subpoena at that point in time. See In re Sealed Case, 655 F.2d 1298 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
227. In re Sealed Case (Tesoro Petroleum), 676 F.2d 793, 805 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
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district court held the lawyer then holding the documents in contempt for refusing to
produce the eight unprivileged documents.
228
The D.C. Circuit disagreed with the district court's rejection of the crime-fraud
exception, and held that it clearly applied to Tesoro's conduct. Since the work-
product privilege is broader than the attorney-client privilege, and since some of the
documents might be protected by work-product even if they were not attorney-client
communications, the court analyzed the case primarily with regard to the work-
product doctrine. 229 The court acknowledged that the work product-privilege does
apply to grand jury investigations as well as to criminal discovery and agency in-
vestigations. 230 It also acknowledged both the crime-fraud exception 23' and the im-
plied waiver doctrine. 232 The court found that even had the crime-fraud exception not
applied, some of the documents would nevertheless lose their work-product protec-
tion because of Tesoro's implied waiver:
Company entered into an arrangement with the SEC under which, as a matter of both
common sense and common knowledge, Company relinquished its right to prevent the
government from examining whatever documents were necessary for a fair evaluation of
the final report offered to its shareholders and the SEC. Just because Company was
successful in hiding crucial documents from the SEC, we need not allow Company to
withhold them from a grand jury investigating possible crimes uncovered during the
SEC's investigation. We do not consider whether we would imply a waiver in other types
of litigation for all of Company's privileged files relating to the report. But the combina-
tion of factors in this case including the fact that some of the documents impeach the
veracity of Company's purported full disclosure, makes it inconsistent with the purposes
of the work product privilege to deny the grand jury access to these documents. 233
The court specifically rejected the limited-waiver theory of attorney-client and work-
product privileges of the Diversified Industries case.234
Throughout the opinion, the court criticized Tesoro's "sleight-of-hand" and
228. In re Subpoena Issued in Grand Jury Investigation, Misc. No. 81-0140 (D.D.C. June 20, 1981) (unreported).
The eight documents are described at In re Sealed Case (Tesoro Petroleum), 676 F.2d 793, 805 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
229. In re Sealed Case (Tesoro Petroleum) 676 F.2d 793, 809-16 (D.C. Cir. 1982). Of course, the court began with
analysis of the seminal work product case, Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947); see also Upjohn Co. v. United
States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
230. In re Sealed Case (Tesoro Petroleum), 676 F.2d 793, 806 (D.C. Cir. 1982); see also Upjohn Co. v. United
States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981); United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225 (1975); In re Special September 1978 Grand Jury (11),
640 F.2d 49 (7th Cir. 1980); In re Grand Jury Subpoena (John Doe, Inc.), 599 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1979); In re Grand Jury
Investigation (Sun Co.), 599 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1979); In re September 1975 Grand Jury Term, 532 F.2d 734 (10th Cir.
1976) (by implication); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Duffy), 473 F.2d 840 (8th Cir. 1973); In re Terkeltaub, 256 F.
Supp. 638 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
231. In re Sealed Case (Tesoro Petroleum), 676 F.2d 793, 807 (D.C. Cir. 1982), citing the leading case of the
"crime-fraud" exception, Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1 (1933), where the principle is stated as follows: "A
privilege surviv[es] until the relation is abused and vanish[es] when abuse is shown to the satisfaction of the judge." Id. at
16.
232. 676 F.2d 793, 807 (D.C. Cir. 1982). The court noted:
Implied waiver deals with an abuse of a privilege itself rather than of a privileged relationship. Where society
has subordinated its interest in the search for truth in favor of allowing certain information to remain con-
fidential, it need not allow that confidentiality to be used as a tool for manipulation of the truth-seeking process.
Id.
233. Id. at 817. The court commented that "voluntary breach of confidence or selective disclosure for tactical
purposes waives the privilege. Disclosure is inconsistent with confidentiality, and courts need not permit hide-and-seek
manipulation of confidences in order to foster candor." Id. at 818.
234. Id. at 823-24; see Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1977) (en bane); see also
Permian Corp. v. United States, 665 F.2d 1214 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
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I 'manipulation" in attempting to misuse attorney- client and work-product privileges.
The court quoted Judge Learned Hand in Loubriel v. United States. 2-3
The question is no less than whether courts must put up with shifts and subterfuges in
the place of truth and are powerless to put an end to trifling. They would prove themselves
incapable of dealing with actualities if it were so, for there is no surer sign of a feeble and
fumbling law than timidity in penetrating the form to the substance .... 116
1 suggest that any counsel conducting an internal investigation read the Sealed
Case opinion at least twice. A portion of its concluding paragraphs is a strong
reminder of a lawyer's duty to guard against a client's manipulation:
The vitality of the adversary system is of great concern to us, as it is to all courts, and
we have due regard for the importance of privilege in maintaining that vitality. It would ill
serve the adversary system, however, if we were to exalt the form of privilege over its
substance. Through the doctrines of implied waiver and exception, the law entrusts the
courts with a duty to guard that the offices of lawyers, and the respect which we have for
the bar, are not used for unfair or corrupt purposes.
In the exercise of that duty, we have determined that there is a substantial likelihood
that the multinational corporation before us has attempted to manipulate its privilege, by
withholding vital documents while making a great pretense of full disclosure of their
contents. It does not deserve the protections enjoyed by those who use the adversary
system for its legitimate ends. Therefore, we have held that the District Court did not err
in ordering Company's attorney to disclose two portions of its former general counsel's
files.... 237
Just as the Southland matter did not end with the John Doe opinion, the Tesoro
matter did not end with the Sealed Case opinion. Presumably the grand jury in-
vestigation continues.238 Derivative and class action litigation is being pursued in the
Texas courts, In that Texas litigation, the U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia has just had occasion to issue another opinion respecting documents relat-
ing to the Tesoro payments investigation now held by two major Texas law firms. 2 3 9
In that case Judge Oberdorfer (one of my prestigious former partners) ordered that
Fulbright & Jaworski and Vinson & Elkins produce for plaintiffs, in private civil
discovery, copies of the documents relating to Tesoro's payments investigation that
had previously been produced to the SEC and to the grand jury. The documents
"consist essentially of the report prepared by the lawyers summarizing their in-
vestigation of the foreign payments allegations, Tesoro documents reviewed by the
lawyers, and notes of the lawyers' interviews of Tesoro employees and others-all of
which are in the hands of the SEC and the Grand Jury." 24( Once again, Tesoro and
235. 9 F.2d 807 (2d Cir- 1926).
236. In re Sealed Ca&e (Tesoro Petroleum), 676 F.2d 793, 825 (D.C O. 1982) (quoting id.).
237 Id. at 825.
238. Apparcntly, the grand jury inquiry evcntually terminated with a decision not to seek a criminal prosecution. See
In re Subpoena Dumes TeurTT] (Fu Ibight & JIaworski and Winson & Elkins, Tesoro Petroleum Corp.) FED. S c. L. REP
(CCHj 91.566 n5 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
239. in re Subpoena Duces Tecum (Ful bri ght & Jaworski and Vinson & Elkins). [1983-1984 Tr-antler Binder] Fut.
SEc- L. Rj. (CC-) 11 99,505 (D.D C Sept. 23, 1983), affd FED. SEC L. Rj-,. (CCH) 11 91,566 (D-C. Cir. Sept. 23,
1984).
240. Id. at 96,931.
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its lawyers resisted production on the basis of attorney-client and work-product priv-
ilege claims. Plaintiffs claimed that delivery of the documents to the SEC and to the
grand jury "waived and fatally fractured those privileges."- 241
Rejecting the limited waiver theory of Diversified Industries,24 2 and applying
the holdings of the D.C. Circuit in both Permian243 and Sealed Case,244 Judge
Oberdorfer held that voluntary disclosure to the SEC in an attempt to benefit Tesoro,
waived the privileges. The court added, "[R]espondents' later response to the Grand
Jury subpoena had no legal consequence. Any claim that the Grand Jury transaction
somehow reversed the SEC disclosure and 'put the genie back into the bottle' is
untenable.''245 Tesoro had stated in producing the documents to the SEC that the
production was not intended to waive attorney-client and work-product privileges.
The court refused to find that the statement, absent some express confidentiality
commitment by the SEC, would create a limited waiver of the work-product priv-
ilege in the circumstances of the case.24 6 The Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit recently affirmed Judge Oberdorfer's holding.
247
C. Citicorp and Ashland Oil
The two separate cases of Citicorp and Ashland Oil have received a great deal of
press attention recently. They deserve some comment in this article, primarily with
respect to the issue of whether all internal investigations should be conducted by
wholly independent outside counsel who have done no prior legal work for the
corporation being investigated. Let me state clearly that I do not advocate such an
extreme position in general, nor do I suggest such an approach was either necessary
or appropriate in either the Ashland Oil or Citicorp matters. I mention the cases solely
so that when counsel conduct internal investigations, they can attempt to structure
their methodology to avoid criticism in the press. 24
8
1. Citicorp
Citicorp had its regular outside counsel, Shearman & Sterling, conduct a major
internal corporate investigation of Citibank's worldwide foreign exchange activities.
The investigation was ordered after a disgruntled employee (subsequently terminated)
alleged that the bank had failed to comply with currency exchange laws and regula-
tions of one or more foreign countries.249
241. Id. at 96,932.
242. Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1977) (en bane).
243. Permian Corp. v. United States, 665 F.2d 1214 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
244. In re Sealed Case (Tesoro Petroleum), 676 F.2d 793 (D.C. Cit. 1982).
245. In re Subpoena Duces Tecum (Fuibright & Jaworski and Vinson & Elkins), 11983-1984 Transfer Binder] Fan.
SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 99,505 at 96,932 (D.D.C. Sept. 23, 1983).
246. Id. at 96,931-32.
247. In re Subpoena Duces Tecum (Fulbright & Jaworski and Vinson & Elkins, Tesoro Petroleum Corp.), FED.
SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 91,566 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 23, 1984).
248. Let me disclose my bias. I recently assisted Lloyd Cutler and Bill Perlik, two of my partners, in representing
Citicorp and some of its executives in congressional testimony encompassing in part a House committee's probing into the
efficacy of Citicorp's internal investigation. My partner Mike Klein and I also serve as counsel to a former officer of an
Ashland Oil subsidiary who was a major witness in Ashland's 1981 internal investigation.
249. See, e.g., Rowan, The Maverick Who Yelled Foul At CitiBank, Fortune, Jan. 10, 1983, at 40.
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After receipt of the report of Citicorp's internal investigation, the SEC con-
ducted a private investigation of the matter, and lower-level Enforcement Division
staff took issue with some of the conclusions in the Citicorp report prepared for a
board committee by Shearman & Sterling. The Enforcement staff investigative attor-
neys recommended that the SEC institute a formal enforcement action against Citi-
corp despite its voluntary internal investigation. But Enforcement Director John
Fedders, with the concurrence of the Director of the Division of Corporation Finance
and the SEC's General Counsel, recommended that enforcement action was not
warranted. The Commission accepted that nonenforcement recommendation in
March 1982 and issued a release rationalizing its nonenforcement decision as follows:
1. The allegations (by the lower level investigative lawyers) were not adequate-
ly established.
2. The Comptroller of the Currency concluded that no enforcement action was
warranted under U.S. banking laws.
3. The alleged amounts were not material.
4. The law concerning disclosure of unadjudicated allegations is unclear. There
would have been a serious possibility of court reversal of the Commission's action
which would establish bad precedent.
5. The matter was essentially a banking or tax case, not a securities case.
6. The case was stale. The questioned practices occurred in the 1973-78 pe-
riod. 250
Critical comment subsequently arose in the press about the SEC's decision to
close down the Citicorp investigation without formal enforcement action. The Shear-
man & Sterling report was harshly criticized in an American Lawyer article. 2 5 ' Both
Citicorp and Shearman & Sterling refuted the criticism in subsequent congressional
testimony. 252 One of the inquiries raised by the House subcommittee was whether
Citicorp should have chosen an outside counsel who had not previously represented
the bank to conduct the internal investigation.
2. Ashland Oil
In 1981, Ashland Oil had the Pittsburgh law firm of Kirkpatrick, Lockhart,
Johnson & Hutchinson conduct an internal corporate investigation of various matters,
including payments made to or for the benefit of a foreign promoter, Yehia Omar, in
the late 1970s and in 1980-81. Chuck Queenan, the Kirkpatrick partner in charge of
the investigation, had previously represented Ashland in various matters, including
the conduct in the "Watergate-foreign payments" era of the mid-70s of a special
investigation encompassing Ashland's domestic political contributions and its foreign
payments.5 3
250. SEC CitiCorp Release, SEC Release No. 82-19 (March 5, 1982); see also Freeman & Kronstein, The Commis-
sion and the CitiCorp Case: Focus on The Legal Issue of Materiality, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 13, 1982, at 32.
251. Brill, What Price Loyalty? AM. LAw., Aug. 1982, at 8.
252. See, e.g., Fialka, Citicorp Says Probes Generally Cleared Its Mid-70s Foreign Currency Dealings, Wall St. J.,
June 29, 1983, at 12, col. 1; see also SEC and Citicorp, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations
ofthe House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., Serial No. 97-193 (Sept. 13 and 17, 1982). Later
testimony by Citicorp officials and a Shearman & Sterling partner before the same House Subcommittee has not yet been
printed.
253. See Ashland Oil Case, supra note 39; see also Ashland Oil Investigation Report (June 26, 1975).
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In 1983, two years after Queenan prepared and Ashland's board of directors
accepted the so-called Queenan Report (sometimes called the Kirkpatrick, Lockhart
Report), the SEC commenced a formal private investigation of Ashland's foreign
payments during the late 1970s and early 1980s, including the matters covered in the
Queenan Report. 5 4 A congressional committee has been informally pursuing its own
inquiries in the Ashland Oil matter. The Queenan Report concluded that no violation
of United States law had occurred and that the company had no obligation to disclose
the investigation or its results. 5 Questions have been raised in the press whether the
Kirkpatrick firm was sufficiently independent of Ashland to conduct the internal
inquiry. 2 56
X. CONCLUSION
The important issue to consider is not whether law firms can investigate their
regular clients.2 7 Of course they can. The issues we should ruminate about are: (i) in
what peculiar types of cases should inside counsel or regular outside counsel not
serve as investigating counsel; and (ii) in those instances when regular outside coun-
sel, or inside counsel, do serve as investigating counsel, what can be done to protect
the integrity and efficacy of the investigation and the report thereof from unwarranted
criticism? 2 58
Obviously, no in-house counsel or regular outside counsel or any other counsel
should participate in an investigation if he or she has participated in or directly or
indirectly counselled the transactions or activities which are the subject matter of the
internal investigation.25 9 Inside counsel should not be charged with investigating
corporate superiors, i.e., the board members or the principal executive officers of the
company. I don't honestly know whether the latter proscription should carry over to
regular outside counsel.
The ALI's first Tentative Draft of the Restatement of Principles of Corporate
Governance contains a comment respecting derivative litigation which states:
Because the role of counsel is especially sensitive in internal corporate investigations
and because considerable reliance on the legal advice given by such counsel is to be
254. See, e.g., Jackson, SEC is Investigating Ashland Oil Payment to Brother of Ex-U.N. Ambassador Young, Wall
St. J., Nov. 21, 1983, at 27, col. 4; Ashland Oil: Trying to Cope With a Diversification Hangover and a Lingering
Scandal, Business Week, Nov. 7, 1983, at 132; Ingrassia, Ashland Oil Fires McKay, Who Disclosed Payments That
Prompted SEC Inquiry, Wall St. J,, Sept. 22, 1983, at 15, col. 2; Taylor, Ashland Oil Bracing For Investigation,
Lexington [Kentucky] Herald-Leader, Sept. 18, 1983, at 1; Arieff, SEC, Congress Question Counsel's Role in Review
of Ashland Oil Payment, Legal Times, May 30, 1983, at 1.
255. See Queenan Report at 215.
256. See, e.g., Arieff, supra note 254, at 1.
257. Should Law Firms Investigate Their Own Clients? Business Week, July 11, 1983, at 59; cf. Noble, Business
and the Law: Investigations by Lawyers, N.Y. Times, Sept. 6, 1983, at D-2, col. I.
258. Arieff, Ethics Reviews Still Deemed Useful for Business, Legal Times, July 25, 1983, at 4; Noble, supra note
257.
259. See Queenan, Conducting Internal Investigations, in A. LEvENSON, A. MATHEWS, & H. Prr, FOREioN
CORRUPT PRACrICES AND INTEmRAL ACcouNTO N CoNTROLs 181, at 189 (1980) ("Use of regular outside counsel may
well be appropriate, except in eases where he had involvement in transactions now under review.")
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presumed where the committee consists of non-lawyers, § 7.03(b)(ii) specifies that "in
the absence of special circumstances" counsel who is independent of the corporation
should be chosen to coordinate and advise such an investigation .... 260
The ALI project's definition of "special counsel" in such situations excludes in-
house counsel, regular corporate counsel, and any other counsel "who have already
advised with respect to the transaction, even if they are not regular counsel, since
they have prejudged the issues."-2 61
I do have one suggestion, though, in cases where one can predict in advance the
possibility of hindsight judgment of third parties raising questions about an alleged
appearance of a lack of independence after the internal investigation is over, the
investigative report filed, and the fact of the investigation and the report's con-
clusions public. At the planning stage, when structuring the methodology of the
internal investigation, counsel and the corporate client might consider providing for
the selection of a wholly disinterested, independent special review person who will,
in effect, investigate the investigator and the report, and issue a "Good Housekeeping
seal of approval" to the internal corporate investigation. I do not mean a consulting
counsel who participates in planning and conducting all or portions of the actual
investigation (i.e., the limited role John Fedders and Arnold & Porter played in
Southland). Rather, I mean a special review person who is retained after the in-
vestigation is over and the report is prepared but before the board committee signs off
in accepting the report. The special review person would do what the SEC Enforce-
ment staff did in the voluntary program-review the methodology and examine the
underlying investigative work product to assure that the investigation was complete
and that the report is both accurate and complete. My colleague Judd Best at Steptoe
& Johnson, who has conducted a few of these investigations, found that procedure
wholly satisfactory in the Page Airways case, z62 and the SEC has used that mech-
anism in several other cases.2 63 As Judd Best has told me more than once, "The
special review person concept preserves for the internal investigative process a public
perception of independence and fairness. And it keeps the troops at the SEC from
being restless!"
260. RESTATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES OF COR'ORATE GOVERNANCE AND STRUCTuRE 319-20 (rent. Draft No. 1,
1982).
261. Id. at 320.
262, See Page Airways Case, supra, note 57.
263, See, e.g., SEC v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., SEC Lit. Release No. 7930 (D.D.C. May 20, 1977) at 12 SEC
Docket No. 6 at 502 (June 6, 1977); IT & T Case, supra note 54; Schlitz Case, supra note 62; SEC v. Foremost-
McKesson, Inc., SEC Lit. Release No. 7479 (D.D.C. July 7, 1976) at 9 SEC Docket No. 20 at 1074 (July 21, 1976).
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Al Sommer may have labelled the internal corporate investigation an extra-legal
institution.2 64 1 submit that it is gradually becoming fully legitimized. Now the task
of the Bar and our corporate clients is to use the mechanism fairly and effica-
ciously, 265 to assure that neither the SEC, nor Congress, nor the courts will take this
self-policing technique away from US.
2 6 6
264. Sommer, supra note 1, at 505.
265. Corporations that have attempted to utilize the internal investigation technique as a cover-up or to produce a
misleading whitewash report have not fared very well. A good illustration is the case of SEC v. Zale Corp., SEC Lit.
Release No. 8081 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 24, 1977) at 12 SEC Docket No. 19 at 1592 (Sept. 6, 1977) [hereinafter cited as Zale
Case].
At issue in the Zale case were allegations by a former treasurer of the corporation that the company had
systematically violated United States and foreign tax laws, and had split the spoils between the corporation and
management. To evaluate these charges, which centered on the corporation's chairman, the Zale board relied on
an investigation conducted principally by the chairman's son. Although the independent committee charged
with conducting the investigation was composed of outsiders ... the SEC concluded that it had failed to
conduct a meaningful independent investigation. When increasing pressure led the committee to attempt a fuller
investigation, the full board interfered and eventually abolished the committee.
Coffee, supra note 42, at 1236. As a result, the SEC sued Zale Corp. in a civil injunctive action. In a consent injunctive
decree, Zale was required to restructure its audit committee, add a number of new, outside, independent directors to its
board, provide adequate training for new directors, and take other precautionary measures. The audit committee was
empowered to investigate management and press claims against any members thereof. The company was also required to
adopt a corporate code of ethics. Zale Case, supra; see also SEC v. Zale Corp., 650 F.2d 718 (5th Cir. 1981).
The SEC has conducted several independent investigations in various cases (in addition to the Southland and Tesoro
Petroleum cases) to test the adequacy of prior internal corporate inquiries. See, e.g., PepsiCo, Inc. v. SEC, 563 F. Supp.
828 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); IT&T Case, supra note 54; Brown, SEC Study Aimed At PepsiCo Probe Into Accounting, Wash.
Post, June 1, 1983, at C-7, col. 5; Guyon, PepsiCo, SEC Spar Over Probe of Overseas Net; Overstatements for 5 Years
Studied; Firm is Seeking Subpoena Notification, Wall St. J., June 1, 1983, at 5, col. 1; see also SEC v. International Tel.
& Tel. Corp. [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 96,452 (D.D.C. May 26, 1978) (order denying motion
to seal complaint), [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. RaP. (CCH) 96,586 (D.D.C. May 4, 1978) (full text of
complaint); Brownstein, Bribery Lessons, Nat'l L.J., Oct. 1, 1983, at 2019 (suit by shareholder Ruth Blecker against
IT&T alleging inadequacy of IT&T's internal foreign payments investigation).
266. This paper dwells on internal corporate investigations involving SEC enforcement actions and compliance with
the federal securities laws. But the internal investigation is often utilized as well by corporations in a number of other
regulatory areas. See, e.g., Westmoreland v. CBS, Inc., 97 F.R.D. 703 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) [investigatory report covering
allegedly libelous television program]; Lowenstein, Charter Co. Conducting In-House Study of Crude-Oil Trades With
Marc Rich & Co., Wall St. J., Sept. 28, 1983, at 6, col. 2; Hughey, Alabama Flap-Olin's Handling of Kickback
Allegation Enriches Informer and Raises Questions, Wall St. J., Sept. 6, 1983, at 58, col. I.
